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A large body of literature finds that cross-listing is associated with capital market benefits. 
However, evidence also suggests that these benefits are mostly temporary. In this paper, I 
investigate whether communication with U.S. investors helps non-U.S. firms maintain the capital 
market benefits of U.S. listings. I find that investor communication mitigates the post cross-listing 
decline in valuation documented by prior studies. I also find that communication choices explain 
variation in the valuation, cost of capital and stock liquidity of cross-listed firms in the long run. 
These results are robust to concerns about potential self-selection bias and are stronger for firms 
from countries with lower corruption risk and fewer cultural differences from U.S. culture. Lastly, 
I compare the valuation of cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms. My findings suggest that a 
significant portion of the cross-listing valuation premium is associated with the investor 
communication practices of these firms. Firms that cross-list in the U.S. but do not communicate 
with U.S. investors are not valued at a premium relative to non-cross-listed firms from the same 
country. Overall, my results are consistent with investor communication being an important 









Cross-listing shares abroad can reduce barriers to foreign investment, such as frictions to 
information flows and limited minority shareholder protection, resulting in capital market benefits 
for firms. Managers frequently state that they cross-list their firms’ stock in order to achieve 
benefits such as greater foreign investor recognition, enhanced stock performance, and increased 
stock liquidity (Baker 1992; Mittoo 1992; Fanto and Karmel 1997). A large body of literature 
studies the consequences of international listings and finds that cross-listing is indeed associated 
with positive capital market outcomes.1 However, evidence also suggests that a significant portion 
of the capital market benefits of cross-listing is temporary, with corporate valuation falling sharply 
in the years after cross-listing (e.g., Foerster and Karolyi 1999; Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler 
2008). There is little consensus in the literature on whether cross-listing produces enduring 
benefits. In this paper, I investigate whether investor communication mitigates the sharp decline 
in valuation post cross-listing and whether it explains variation in cross-listed firms’ valuation and 
liquidity in the long run after cross-listing.                                    
While studies have sought to explain the time-series and cross-sectional variation in the 
benefits of cross-listing, little attention has been paid to the role of voluntary disclosure. Disclosure
                                                 




by management can decrease information asymmetry and mitigate international visibility issues, 
increasing stock liquidity and market valuation (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Easley and 
O’Hara 2004). In this paper, I address a gap in the literature and focus on the relation between the 
benefits of cross-listing and four channels of management-investor communication, namely 
corporate access events, conference calls, press releases, and management forecasts. 
Prior literature suggests two main explanations for the capital market outcomes of cross-
listing: increased investor recognition associated with a broader shareholder base (the investor 
recognition hypothesis) and better investor protection (the bonding hypothesis). Both explanations 
are related to improvements in the information environment of firms. I argue that foreign firms 
that do not meet the expectations of U.S. investors and analysts regarding the frequency and form 
of corporate communication may not be able to keep the long-run benefits of a U.S. listing because 
they are either unable to maintain investor recognition or to fulfill bonding expectations.  
If a firm cross-lists, attracting initial international visibility, but it is unable to maintain this 
visibility, most of the long-run benefits of cross-listing will fail to materialize. Similarly, cross-
listed firms that do not communicate with U.S. investors may not be able to effectively “bond” 
themselves to the U.S. market institutions because of residual information asymmetry issues. 
Richer information environments would allow U.S. market participants to better monitor 
managerial behavior, increasing the bonding effects. I posit that the management communication 
strategies of non-U.S. firms focused on U.S. audiences are related to cross-listed firms’ success in 
maintaining higher levels of liquidity and valuation post cross-listing. Institutional ownership, 
media coverage, and analyst following are potential channels through which communication helps 
firms maintain the benefits of cross-listing. 
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Although the association between investor communication and positive capital market 
outcomes when firms and investors are from the same country has been established in prior studies 
(e.g., Bushee and Miller 2012; Kirk and Vincent 2014), less is known about investor 
communication across country borders. Direct and indirect barriers to foreign investment that 
cannot be influenced by management, such as country-level corruption risk and pronounced 
differences between cultures, can prevent communication choices from having a significant 
relation to capital markets outcomes. Results from cross-sectional tests in this study support the 
idea that communication is more effective for firms from countries with lower perceived 
corruption and fewer cultural differences from U.S. culture. 
A number of studies find that U.S. listings by non-U.S. companies are associated with 
positive valuation outcomes. However, only a few papers examine the importance of the 
information environment as a factor. These studies find that firms that most expand their 
shareholder base, analyst following, and media coverage exhibit the greatest increase in valuation 
around cross-listing (Foerster and Karolyi 1999; Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver 2002; Lang, Lins, 
and Miller 2003a). Also, some firms are able to maintain these increases in valuation in the long 
run only if they also maintain a larger U.S. shareholder base over time (King and Segal 2009). 
These studies, at best, provide indirect evidence of a relation between firm-level information and 
the valuation benefits of cross-listing. They do not show specifically what managers do to achieve 
and maintain these benefits. 
Managers often cite increased liquidity as one of the main perceived benefits of cross-
listing. A commitment to increased disclosure after cross-listing can reduce adverse selection 
among buyers and sellers of the firm’s shares increasing liquidity (Kyle 1985; Glosten and 
Milgrom 1985).While the valuation benefits of cross-listing have received relatively more 
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attention in the literature, studies have also examined patterns in the stock liquidity of firms after 
they cross-list on U.S. markets (e.g., Smith and Sofianos 1997; Foerster and Karolyi 1998; 
Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan 1998). They find that, on average, firms experience increases in 
stock liquidity after cross-listing. However, these studies also document significant cross-sectional 
variation in these stock liquidity patterns, depending on the level of domestic market development 
and firm size (e.g., Pulatkonak and Sofianos 1999; Halling, Pagano, and Zechner 2008; Silva and 
Chávez 2008). My analysis in this paper documents that investor communication strategies help 
explain the cross-sectional variation in stock liquidity of non-U.S. firms after cross-listing. 
I focus on cross-listings in the U.S. for two reasons. First, U.S. institutional investors 
control roughly 50% of the total global assets under management. Listings in the U.S. thus provide 
non-U.S. firms with access to a large pool of potential investors. Second, U.S. investors have high 
expectations regarding the disclosure behavior of firms, which may increase the relevance of 
communication choices in this setting. My analysis covers four channels of investor 
communication: corporate access events held in the U.S., conference calls in English, press 
releases disseminated through newswires in English, and management forecasts. I assess these 
different forms of communication separately and together, using an investor communication score, 
both around the cross-listing period and in the long run after cross-listing. 
I find that investor communication mitigates the post cross-listing decline in valuation 
documented by prior studies.2, 3 My results indicate that the decline in valuation is steeper for firms 
that communicate with local investors prior to cross-listing, but do not communicate in the U.S. 
                                                 
2 This result is robust to the exclusion of firms issuing shares in the U.S. at the time of cross-listing from the sample. 
 
3 I use Tobin’s q and contemporaneous stock returns as measures of valuation in these tests. Results are qualitatively 
similar using both measures. 
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post cross-listing, consistent with these firms not fulfilling communication expectations in the U.S. 
The investor recognition and bonding hypotheses predict a decline in cost of capital post cross-
listing. Hail and Leuz (2009) investigate the association between cross-listing and implied cost of 
capital and find evidence that firms with cross-listings on U.S. exchanges experience a significant 
decrease in their cost of capital. I find that the decline in the cost of capital post cross-listing 
happens mainly for cross-listed firms that communicate with U.S. investors.  
I also find that communication choices explain variation in the valuation and stock liquidity 
of cross-listed firms from the same country in the long run. These results are stronger for firms 
from countries with lower perceived corruption and fewer cultural differences from U.S. culture. 
In addition, I find that the valuation and liquidity of cross-listed firms are positively related to 
firms’ U.S. institutional investor, media, and analyst following and that there is a positive and 
significant relation between communication and following variables post cross-listing. Therefore, 
I posit that increasing and maintaining institutional, media, and analyst following are potential 
mechanisms by which communication choices affect the valuation and stock liquidity of cross-
listed firms.  
Numerous studies document that cross-listed firms are valued at a premium relative to non-
cross-listed firms (e.g., Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2004, 2009; Lang et al. 2003a).  I compare the 
valuation of cross-listed and matched non-cross-listed firms, and I find that a significant portion 
of this valuation premium is associated with the investor communication practices of these groups 
of firms. Firms that cross-list but do not communicate with U.S. investors are not valued more 
highly than firms that do not cross-list. These results suggest that the cross-listing valuation 
premium is conditional on firms communicating with U.S. investors.  
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Cross-listed firms in my sample have self-selected to communicate with investors. This 
may raise concerns that self-section bias impacts the empirical results. In an attempt to alleviate 
these concerns, I conduct a series of additional tests. First, I model the firm’s decision to 
communicate with investors through corporate access. I use two-stage least squares regressions 
and the availability of direct flights between corporate headquarters and the U.S as a source of 
exogenous variation in firms’ investor communication. 4  I also control for firms’ communication 
choices in the home market in these regressions. The results of the two-stage instrumental variable 
regressions are consistent with my predictions and main tests. Cross-listed firms that communicate 
more with U.S. investors and analysts have higher valuation and liquidity. 
Increased valuation can be a result of increased growth expectations, decreased cost of 
capital, or both. Therefore, a related concern about the documented association between investor 
communication and the valuation of cross-listed firms is that it may reflect only the concurrent 
changes in firms’ growth opportunities that do not stem from communication. In an attempt to 
account for this concern, I start by verifying that investor communication is significantly 
associated with reduced implied cost of equity capital for cross-listed firms. I then proceed by 
investigating whether my valuation results are sensitive to the type of news being disclosed. I 
divide observations into good and bad news firm-years, based on whether the average sentiment 
of firm-initiated press releases is positive or negative. My results suggest that levels of investor 
communication are positively associated with Tobin’s q for both good and bad news firm-years. 
                                                 
4 Since the availability of direct flights between two countries may be related to the levels of bilateral trade and foreign 
direct investment, in first- and second-stage regressions I control for country-year levels of foreign direct investment 




These findings help alleviate the concern that investor communication is positively related only to 
the valuation of cross-listed firms with positive growth expectations.  
Financial reporting quality may play a role in communication effectiveness. Higher quality 
financial reporting may increase the credibility of voluntary disclosures (Gigler and Hemmer 
1998). Exchange-listed firms in my sample are subject to additional financial reporting 
requirements and potentially higher SEC scrutiny than firms cross-listed over the counter. 
Evidence from Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003b) suggests that exchange cross-listed firms have 
higher quality earnings than OTC cross-listed firms. Consistent with the idea that financial 
reporting quality increases the effectiveness of voluntary investor communication, results from my 
cross-sectional tests suggest that, within country, exchange cross-listed firms benefit more from 
investor communication than OTC cross-listed firms. These results may be due to differences in 
the financial reporting quality and SEC scrutiny of firms in the various levels of listing. 
Cross-listed firms have their shares trading in different markets and can, at least partially, 
choose which market participants (domestic or foreign) to communicate with. I take advantage of 
the fact that corporate access events tend to be catered to investors from the host country, and that 
cross-listed firms’ shares trade in different countries, and in falsification tests, I investigate whether 
communication choices focused on non-U.S. investors relate to the liquidity in the U.S. and vice-
versa. I find that communication choices focused on domestic investors are not significantly 
associated with liquidity in the U.S., and that communication choices focused on U.S. investors 
are not significantly associated with liquidity in the firms’ domestic markets. I also find that the 
proportion of domestic to U.S. communication events is negatively associated with the valuation 
of cross-listed firms, consistent with U.S. investors discounting these stocks because of increased 
perceived information disadvantages relative to domestic investors. 
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The analysis that follows contributes to two existing bodies of literature: research on cross-
listings and research on investor communication. Evidence from the literature on investor relations 
suggests that financial communication choices of U.S. firms are related to firms’ domestic investor 
and analyst following (e.g., Bushee and Miller 2012; Kirk and Vincent 2014). Less is known about 
the effectiveness of investor communication when firms and investors are from different countries. 
The literature on cross-listing indicates that increased foreign investor recognition and richer 
information environments are related to the cross-listing valuation premium through increased 
investor and analyst following (Lang et al. 2003a; King and Segal 2009). To my knowledge, this 
study makes the first attempt to link these two strains of literature by examining variation in 
investor communication as a potential source of variation in cross-listing outcomes. Overall, my 
empirical findings suggest that investor communication is an important condition for firms to 
achieve the long-run benefits of cross-listing and should be accounted for when analyzing the 
valuation premium of cross-listed firms relative to non-cross-listed firms. 
The literature review and research hypotheses follow in the next section. I discuss the 
sample and the variables in Section 3. Section 4 presents the research design and empirical 







Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
 
The effects of cross-listing shares abroad have been analyzed extensively (Karolyi 1998, 
2006). Empirical evidence suggests two main explanations for the capital market outcomes of 
cross-listing: increased investor recognition associated with a broader shareholder base (the 
investor recognition hypothesis) based on Merton (1987), and better investor legal protection (the 
bonding hypothesis) proposed by Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999). In this paper, I focus on 
communication choices as a mechanism through which cross-listed firms improve their 
information environments, increase investor recognition and reputational bonding, and achieve 
higher liquidity and valuations as a result. 
Many of the empirical studies on cross-listings investigate the market valuation changes 
around a firm’s international listing. Miller (1999) finds a positive 1.15% average abnormal return 
for ADR announcement dates between 1985 and 1995. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) employ weekly 
abnormal returns for the two years around the U.S. cross-listing dates between 1976 and 1992 and 
not only find a significant listing week return of 1% on average but also uncover an interesting 
pre-listing run-up of abnormal returns of 19% and an average post-listing decline of 14%. 
Consistent with Foerster and Karolyi’s results, Mittoo (2003) finds that Canadian firms outperform 
the market by 30–40% in the year prior to cross-listing, but underperform Canadian market indexes 
by 13–30% over the three years after the U.S. listing.  Using global listings, Sarkinsian and Schill 
(2009) expand the stock return analysis to longer windows between 1995 and 2005 and find that 
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much of the valuation gains to overseas listings are not permanent and practically disappear five 
years after cross-listing. Gozzi et al. (2008) uncover a similar pattern analyzing the Tobin’s q 
valuation ratio of cross-listings in the U.K and the U.S. between 1989 and 2000. They find that 
Tobin’s q does not rise after cross-listing. Instead, q rises significantly before and during the cross-
listing year but then falls sharply in the following year, quickly reversing the increases of the 
previous years.  
Findings on the transitory nature of cross-listing benefits can be explained by the investor 
recognition hypothesis, as long as we assume that investor recognition peaks around cross-listing 
but then dissipates over time.  According to Merton (1987), an increase in the number of investors 
who are aware of the firm’s existence reduces its cost of capital. When few investors consider a 
particular stock in their investment universe, markets can clear only if some investors take very 
large and undiversified positions. These investors require higher returns to compensate for the 
higher risks they are taking, increasing the firm’s cost of capital. Merton states that managers of 
such firms “should expend resources of the firm to induce investors who are not currently 
shareholders to incur the necessary costs of becoming aware of the firm” (p. 500). Consistent with 
Merton’s theoretical analysis, Lehavy and Sloan (2008) find that investor recognition of a firm’s 
stock can explain more of the variation in returns than fundamentals, such as earnings and cash 
flows.  
Evidence from the cross-listing literature is consistent with Merton’s investor recognition 
hypothesis: cross-listing increases awareness and contributes positively to valuation. Foerster and 
Karolyi (1999) find that the number of shareholders of cross-listed firms increases by 
approximately 30% around cross-listing. They also find that firms that expand their shareholder 
base the most exhibit the greatest increase in stock price around the listing announcement. Using 
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a sample of Canadian firms, King and Segal (2009) show that not all firms exhibit higher 
valuations following a U.S. listing. The firms that benefit most are the ones that are successful in 
broadening their U.S. investor base. In addition, cross-listed firms experience increases in analyst 
following and media coverage, both of which are associated with an increase in valuation around 
the listing (Baker et al. 2002; Lang et al. 2003a).  
Findings on the transitory nature of the cross-listing benefits are usually interpreted as 
inconsistent with the bonding hypothesis since better investor protection should produce enduring 
increases in valuation for cross-listed firms. If U.S. laws by themselves can actually deter foreign 
insiders from engaging in misappropriation and fraud (Coffee 1999) we should observe permanent 
increases in valuation. However, if we assume that SEC and other market participants’ oversight 
of cross-listed firms are imperfect but can be facilitated by firms’ information environments, and 
firms’ information environments change over time, we could observe time-varying bonding 
effects.  
Consistent with the idea that the litigation risk of cross-listed firms in the U.S. depends on 
the quality of firms’ information environment, Beiting, Srinivasan, and Yu (2014) find that U.S. 
cross-listed foreign companies experience securities class action lawsuits at about half the rate as 
do U.S. firms. However, once a lawsuit triggering event occurs, they find no difference in the 
litigation rates between a foreign and comparable U.S. firm. This evidence suggests that the 
litigation risk of cross-listed firms is constrained by transaction costs, but the effect of transaction 
cost can be significantly reduced in the presence of quality information triggers that reveal 
potential misconduct of the firm. 
Siegel (2005) provides further evidence for the notion that increased investor and analyst 
oversight could benefit cross-listed firms. In his detailed analysis of evidence from Mexican firms, 
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he notes that some insiders exploited SEC’s weak legal enforcement of cross-listed firms. By 
contrast, managers from other cross-listed firms emerged from an economic downturn with a clean 
reputation and went on to receive privileged long-term access to outside finance. Siegel proposes 
that reputational bonding of cross-listed firms can be strengthened even more when the U.S. 
information environment is stronger. Increasing media and analyst scrutiny strengthen reputational 
bonding, and firms gain better access to capital. Even without effective legal enforcement, the 
investor communication and subsequent following can enable cross-listed firms to bond 
themselves by building their reputation. 
Overall, the cross-listing literature provides evidence consistent with changes in valuation 
around cross-listing being associated with changes in investor, media, and analyst following during 
the same period. The disclosure literature, on the other hand, provides evidence on the association 
between corporate communication and institutional ownership, media coverage, and analyst 
following. Lang and Lundholm (1993) find that U.S. companies with higher analysts’ evaluations 
of firms’ disclosures have larger analyst following, less dispersion in analyst forecasts, and less 
volatility in forecast revisions. Francis, Hanna, and Philbrick (1997) find that there is an increase 
in analyst coverage for firms making presentations to the New York Society of Securities Analysts. 
Analyzing firms that have significant and sustained improvements in their analysts’ ratings of 
firms’ disclosures, Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) show that disclosure rating increases are 
accompanied by analyst following increases. In addition, the prior literature on investor relations 
indicates that the investor communication choices of U.S. firms are related to U.S. institutional 
investor, media coverage, and analyst following (Bushee and Miller 2012; Bushee, Jung, and 
Miller 2011; Kirk and Vincent 2014; Kirk and Markov 2016). Using a survey of global firms in 
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2012, Karolyi and Liao (2015) find that responses on IR activities are associated with higher 
analyst following and increased Tobin’s q.  
Taken together, theory and evidence from the cross-listing and financial communication 
literature suggest that investor communication could prevent the decline in valuation after cross-
listing by helping firms to maintain better information environments and higher levels of investor 
recognition and reputational bonding. My first hypothesis is, therefore, the following: 
H1: The decline in valuation post cross-listing is mitigated by investor communication. 
 Besides looking at the valuation changes around a firm’s international listing, many studies 
investigate cross-sectional differences in the valuation of cross-listed firms in the long run. These 
studies usually use Tobin’s q as a measure of valuation and compare the valuation ratios of cross-
listed and non-cross-listed firms. They find that in the long run after cross-listing, cross-listed firms 
tend to be valued more highly than their non-cross-listed counterparts. The literature usually refers 
to this difference in valuation as the cross-listing valuation premium.  
Doidge et al. (2004) use the Worldscope database universe of firms and find that firms 
listed in the U.S. have Tobin’s q ratios that are 16.5% higher than the q ratios of firms from the 
same country that do not list in the U.S. However, the valuation premium seems to be conditional 
on firms keeping high levels of institutional ownership. King and Segal (2009) find that cross-
listed Canadian firms with a single class of shares that attract few or no U.S. investors are valued 
no differently than non-cross-listed Canadian firms, after controlling for firm characteristics. 
While studies have sought to explain the cross-sectional variation in the long-run benefits 
of cross-listing, little attention has been paid to the role of voluntary disclosure. Economic theory 
predicts a negative association between voluntary disclosure and cost of equity capital (e.g., 
Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Easley and O’Hara 2004). In accordance with this idea, Baginski 
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and Rakow (2012) examine the relation between management earnings forecast disclosure and the 
cost of equity of U.S. firms after Reg FD. They find evidence of a negative association between 
the quality of management earnings forecasting policy and the cost of equity.  
Using a sample of U.S. firms presenting at broker-hosted investor conferences, Green, 
Jame, Markov, and Subasi (2014) find that conference firms experience a 0.03 increase in Tobin’s 
q in the year following the event. Using a sample of U.S. and non-U.S. firms, Karolyi and Liao 
(2015) analyze the results of a 2012 global survey of Investor Relations officers and find that more 
active IR programs are associated with a 12% higher Tobin’s q valuation ratio. Activity is 
measured by responses to the firms’ involvement in broker-sponsored conferences, one-on-one 
meetings with institutional investors, global outreach, formal disclosure, media and governance 
policies. According to Karolyi and Liao (2015), the cost of capital is the channel that links IR and 
market value.  
Given the theoretical and empirical evidence cited above, my second hypothesis is as 
follows: 
H2:  Investor communication choices are associated with higher levels of valuation in the long 
run after cross-listing. 
A U.S. listing may also result in increased stock liquidity, as cross-listing can be perceived 
as a commitment to increased disclosure and, therefore, reduce adverse selection among buyers 
and sellers of the firm’s shares. Surveys of managers indicate that increased liquidity is one of the 
main perceived benefits of cross-listing. However, empirical evidence suggests significant 
variation in the liquidity benefits of cross-listing. Using a sample of Canadian firms that cross-list 
in the U.S., Foerster and Karolyi (1998) find that overall bid-ask spreads in the domestic market 
decrease after cross-listing. However, the decrease in trading costs is concentrated in those stocks 
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that experience a significant shift of total trading volume to the U.S. exchange after listing. Using 
a sample of firms from Latin American countries, Silva and Chávez (2008) find that larger cross-
listed firms from specific countries seem to benefit from improved liquidity, but the liquidity 
benefit cannot be generalized to smaller cross-listed firms. This variation in the liquidity outcomes 
of cross-listing can be a result of variation in the information asymmetry between local and U.S. 
investors for different firms. 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) and Kim and Verrecchia (1994) propose that voluntary 
disclosure reduces information asymmetries among informed and uninformed investors. As a 
result, firms with high disclosure experience an increase in stock liquidity. These studies also argue 
that greater disclosure and stock liquidity will be associated with increased institutional ownership. 
Given the theoretical and empirical evidence cited above, my third hypothesis is as follows: 
H3: Investor communication choices are associated with higher levels of stock liquidity in the 






Sample and Variables 
 
Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
My period of analysis is from 2004 to 2014. I restrict my analysis to this period because 
the coverage of investor communication activities of non-U.S. firms prior to 2004 is relatively 
limited on Bloomberg, I/B/E/S Guidance and Factiva. My sample comprises non-U.S. firms that 
cross-listed their shares in the U.S. between 2006 and 2013, including both exchange and over-
the-counter listings, and a matched sample of firms cross-listed in the U.S. prior to 2006 from the 
same country and industry, and closest in size to my sample of 2006-2013 cross-listings. The 
rationale for matching cross-listings between 2006 and 2013 to older cross-listings is to keep 
comparable samples for tests around cross-listing and in the long run after cross-listing. In order 
to measure the relation between communication choices and the valuation of cross-listed firms 
relative to non-cross-listed firms, I also match my main sample of cross-listed firm-years to a 
control sample of non-cross-listed (domestic) firm-years from the same country and industry and 
closest in size, as measured by total assets in U.S. dollars.  
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The list of cross-listed firms was obtained from EDGAR 20-F and 6-K filings,5 as well as 
the Bank of New York, Citibank and JP Morgan lists of ADRs. Cross-listing dates are collected 
from the depositary banks’ lists, as well as from CRSP.  
Table 1 describes the sample selection process. I exclude firms that do not have the 
necessary data to construct my variables in Datastream, as well as firms with negative 
shareholders’ equity and total assets less than 10 million USD. Table 2 panel A provides the 
summary statistics separately for the 2006-2013 cross-listings, cross-listings made prior to 2006, 
and non-cross-listed firms. Cross-listed firms not only tend to be larger than non-cross-listed firms 
but also have higher sales growth and Tobin’s q. Cross-listed firms also have higher investor and 
analyst following. Importantly for my analysis, they communicate more frequently with investors. 
Panel B outlines the distribution of observations by country. No country in the sample comprises 
more than 15% of the observations. Countries with the highest number of observations are 
Australia (14.6%), China (12.3%), the U.K. (9%), Canada (8%), and Brazil (7.2%). Panel C 
presents the correlation matrix. Important for my analysis are the positive and significant 
correlations between the four communication variables, between corporate access in the home 
country and in the US, and between the communication variables and institutional ownership, 
analyst following, liquidity measures, and Tobin’s q.  
The positive correlation between the four communication choices suggests that firms tend 
to use these channels simultaneously. I explore the relation among communication variables in 
more detail in Table 3. Table 3 panel A presents the characteristics of cross-listed firm-years by 
each investor communication choice. Of the cross-listed firms that decide to attend at least one 
                                                 
5 I thank David Maber and Jason V. Chen for providing this data. 
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corporate access event in the U.S., 86% also hold at least one English conference call, 80% 
distribute at least one press release in English through the newswires, and 44% also disclose at 
least one management forecast during the year. Of the firms that decide to distribute at least one 
English press release during the year, 31% also attend at least one corporate access event in the 
U.S., 70% hold an English conference call, and 33% disclose a management forecast. Overall, the 
descriptive statistics in panel A suggest that firms that attend corporate access events and disclose 
management forecasts also tend to use other channels, while firms that hold conference calls and 
distribute press releases do not necessarily use other channels.  
Table 3 panel B presents the results of the factor analysis of the four communication 
variables using principal-component factors. The least common communication choices are 
management forecasts and corporate access events in the U.S. The most common communication 
choices are conference calls and press releases. The findings in panels A and B support the idea 
that corporate access and management forecasts are more costly and less frequently used, while 




My main explanatory variables of interest reflect management communication choices 
focused on U.S. investors. These variables include the number of corporate access events held in 
the U.S., conference calls in English, firm-initiated press releases in English disseminated through 
newswires, and management forecasts. Data on corporate access events is collected from the 
Bloomberg Corporate Events database and includes capital market conferences, investor days, and 
non-deal roadshows held in the U.S. Given time and monetary costs of managers’ international 
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travel, I assume that managers who travel to participate in investor conferences will also hold one-
on-one meetings during their time in the U.S. Therefore, I include attendance in investor 
conferences in my measure of U.S. investors’ access to management events.  
Since I want to capture only events catering to U.S. investors, I hand-collect the location 
of corporate events with that information missing in Bloomberg, and I exclude those events for 
which I could not identify the venue based on a web search. I assume that firms without event data 
on Bloomberg did not hold events in the U.S. during that year. Data on conference calls is also 
collected from Bloomberg. Data on firm-initiated press releases is gathered from Factiva and 
includes press releases disseminated through PR Newswire and Business Wire. I collect 
management forecasts from I/B/E/S Guidance and include any type and horizon of management 
guidance disclosed by the firm during the year. Given that my communication variables are 
significantly correlated and may represent one common latent factor, I construct an investor 
communication score using factor analysis. The scoring coefficients on each of the communication 
variables are presented in Table 3 panel B. 
The investor communication activities analyzed in this study are voluntary, therefore, it is 
important to understand what firm and country characteristics are associated with these choices. 
Table 3 panel C presents the results for the determinants of the decision of cross-listed firms to 
communicate with U.S. investors. Firms that hold more corporate access events in their home 
country tend to communicate more in the U.S. as well, suggesting a positive relation between 
firms’ domestic and international communication choices. Larger firms, that cross-list in an 
exchange (versus over-the-counter), that have a higher proportion of international sales, and that 
are issuing equity also communicate more.  
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I find that lead asset growth is not significantly associated with investor communication. 
Similar results are obtained using lead and lagged sales and capex growth. Lead earnings growth 
is only weakly positively associated with investor communication choices. These results partially 
mitigate the concern that firm growth is an omitted correlated variable in the outcome regressions 
analyzed later in this paper. To measure future realized growth, I calculate the percentage change 
in sales, assets, capital expenditures and earnings from year t to year t+1.  Asset growth and capital 
expenditures are used in prior studies as measures of corporate investment (e.g., Beatty, Liao, and 
Yu 2013; Shroff, Verdi, and Yu 2014). I focus on lead changes under the assumption that the firm 
changes its current period communication based on expectations about future performance, and 
that current expectations are positively correlated to future realizations of firm growth. 
Within and across countries, IFRS mandates are positively associated with investor 
communication of cross-listed firms. Across countries, firms from countries that are more 
culturally similar to the U.S, that have English as an official language, that have a civil legal 
tradition, and that have higher levels of corruption communicate more. These results are consistent 
with lower cultural and language barriers6 reducing the costs of communication. Firms from 
countries with civil legal tradition and higher corruption levels may communicate more in an 
attempt to overcome the weaker institutions in their home markets. 
Appendix 1 offers definitions of all variables used in the empirical tests. Following prior 
studies in the cross-listing literature, I use Tobin’s q as my main dependent variable representing 
                                                 
6 Even though firms from countries where English is an official language tend to communicate more with U.S. 
investors, there is still significant variation in the communication choices of firms from English speaking countries. 
For example, around 59% of the English speaking cross-listed firms in my sample do not hold conference calls, and 
50% do not disseminate press releases through newswires. 
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the benefits of cross-listing.7 Tobin’s q is computed as the ratio of total assets less the book value 
of equity plus the market value of equity in the numerator and book value of assets in the 
denominator as of the end of the fiscal year. I replicate my main valuation results using a cost of 
capital measure that follows the methodology in Claus and Thomas (2001). As increased liquidity 
is also mentioned as one of the main benefits of cross-listing, I also include two measures of stock 
liquidity as dependent variables: average bid-ask spreads and shares turnover. Since my 
explanatory variables aim to capture communication efforts aimed at U.S. investors, both liquidity 
measures are computed in the U.S. market. I use the following control variables in all regressions: 
firm size, equity issuance, internationalization of sales, IFRS mandates, future growth 
opportunities, leverage, and profitability. Firm size is computed as the log of total assets in U.S. 
dollars. Equity issuance is an indicator variable equal to one when the firm issues shares during 
the year. I proxy internationalization using the ratio of international sales to total sales during the 
year. I proxy future growth opportunities using sales growth computed as the percent change in 
sales from year t-1 to year t. Leverage is calculated as total debt divided by total assets. Profitability 
is measured by the return on assets (ROA), calculated as net income scaled by total assets.  
To compute my institutional ownership variables, I sum U.S. institutional positions using 
the holdings by 6-digit Cusip from Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings and Thomson-Reuters 
Mutual Funds Databases. I delete duplicates by manager code before adding the holdings of the 
two databases. Number of Institutions is the number of distinct institutional investors. As 
Bradshaw, Bushee, and Miller (2004) point out, in the presence of restrictions on foreign 
ownership magnitudes, different levels of free float across countries, or large block investments, 
                                                 
7 King and Segal (2009), Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004, 2009), Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler (2008), and Lang, 




this measure can provide a better measure of U.S. institutional interest in a stock than the 
percentage of institutional holdings. I assume that firms with no U.S. institutional investor holdings 
data have zero U.S. institutional ownership. Number of Analysts is the number of distinct analysts 
issuing forecasts of the company’s earnings during the calendar year according to I/B/E/S. 
It is important to note that country-level characteristics may also affect U.S. holdings of 
foreign stocks. These characteristics include close geographical proximity, a high number of U.S. 
listings, credible accounting information, high disclosure requirements, and low transaction costs 
on the home exchange. I assume that these characteristics do not vary during my period of analysis 
and are appropriately accounted for using country fixed effects. Later on, I relax this assumption 
by using a matched country and industry control sample. In untabulated tests, I also run regressions 







Research Design and Findings 
 
Communication choices may be important in mitigating decreases in valuation post cross-
listing, as well as in maintaining higher valuations and liquidity in the long run. My main tests, 
therefore, include regressions of valuation and cost of capital on investor communication choices 
around the cross-listing period for firms cross-listed between 2006 and 2013, and after cross-listing 
for both 2006-2013 cross-listings and a sample of older cross-listings (firms cross-listed prior to 
2006). Since my liquidity variables are measured in the U.S. market, all liquidity tests are 
performed after cross-listing. 
 
 Relation between Communication and the Decline in Valuation Post Cross-Listing 
I start my tests by examining the relation between the decline in valuation and investor 
communication post cross-listing. If we assume that investor recognition can be transitory, 
communication strategies aimed at maintaining investor recognition can be critical in cementing 
the permanent valuation gains from a U.S. listing (King and Mittoo 2007). Firms may experience 
increases in visibility around the time of cross-listing, but attention to these firms may fade away 
if firms do not take actions to maintain it in the long term. Thus, investor communication may be 
important in keeping and attracting visibility after cross-listing takes place. In addition, investor 
communication can be an important component of the bonding process of cross-listed firms in the 
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U.S. market. In an attempt to capture the relation of investor communication and the decline in 
valuation in the years post cross-listing, I estimate the following regression: 
Valuation Variableit= β0+ β1 Postit+ β2 High Communicationit × Postit+ β3 High Communicationit  
                                 + 𝛽4Equity Issuanceit +  𝛽5 International Salesit + 𝛽6IFRSit +  𝛽7Log Assetsit                
                                  + β
8
 Sales Growthit + β
9
ROAit+ β10 Leverageit+  Industry FEsi  
                             + Country FEsi + Year FEst + εit                                                                                         (1) 
I cluster standard errors in all regressions by firm. My main valuation variable is Tobin’s 
q. I also estimate regression (1) using cost of capital and contemporaneous annual stock returns as 
alternative dependent valuation variables. High Communication is an indicator variable that equals 
one for the upper quartile of the investor communication score for cross-listed firms. To investigate 
the relation between investor communication and firm valuation, I control for firm characteristics 
that have been shown to determine firm valuation in the cross-listing setting (e.g., Lang et al. 
2003a; King and Segal 2009), such as sales growth, book leverage, book value of total assets and 
return on assets. Sales growth is a proxy for a firm’s growth opportunities. Log of book value of 
total assets is used to proxy for firm size. ROA is used to control for firm profitability. Since equity 
issuance may be associated with current valuation and incentives to communicate, I also control 
for firms’ equity issuance during the year. Within country, changes in accounting standards can be 
associated with changes in valuation, thus I control for IFRS mandates in all regressions. More 
internationalized firms can have higher valuations and also more incentives to communicate, 
therefore I control for firms’ proportion of international sales. Finally, valuation may differ across 
firms because of potentially unobservable country/industry sources of heterogeneity. For this 
reason, I include country and industry fixed effects. 
Figure 1 presents the average Tobin’s q around cross-listing (years [-2,-1] versus [+1, +2]) 
for sample firms with high and low investor communication. Firms with investor communication 
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scores in the upper (lower) quartile are considered high (low) investor communication firms. The 
univariate evidence in this plot suggests that firms with low investor communication experience a 
sharp decline in valuation post cross-listing, but high investor communication firms do not. 
Table 4 panel A presents multivariate regressions quantifying the valuation ratio pre- and 
post-cross-listing, the year of cross-listing being the first year that Post equals one. Column 1 
shows the regression results of Tobin’s q on the control variables and an indicator variable for post 
cross-listing years. Thus, the valuation ratio in years prior to cross-listing is captured by the 
intercept. The results in column 1 indicate that, after I control for firm and country characteristics, 
on average cross-listed firms experience a decrease in Tobin’s q of -0.08 in the years following 
cross-listing in relation to the years preceding cross-listing. For the average cross-listed firm in my 
sample, this represents a decrease of 5% in Tobin’s q. This finding is consistent with prior studies. 
King and Segal (2009) document a decrease of 15% in Tobin’s q in the years post cross-listing for 
a sample of Canadian firms cross-listed in the U.S. between 1988 and 2005. 
In column 2, I examine how investor communication interacts with this decline in 
valuation. The coefficient on the interaction of Post and communication is positive and significant, 
indicating that the average decline in valuation post cross-listing is driven by low communication 
firms. 8, 9  
Researchers have documented the poor performance of long-run stock returns following 
equity offerings, consistent with managers timing offerings when the stock price is overvalued 
                                                 
8 Results in table 4 are robust to the exclusion of observations from years 2007, 2008, and 2009 from the regressions. 
 
9 In untabulated tests, I exclude all control variables and run the regressions including only the investor communication 
variable and country, year and industry fixed-effects. The results are qualitatively the same, mitigating concerns of a 




(Loughran and Ritter 1995). Equity offerings can provide incentives for managers to inflate prices 
through firm disclosures to extract rents from purchasing investors at issuance. Lang and 
Lundholm (2000) suggest firms can use voluntary disclosures to hype their stock before issuing 
equity. Using a sample of 41 offering U.S. firms and a matched sample of 41 non-offering U.S. 
firms, they find that offering firms increase their disclosure before the announcement and that the 
increase in disclosure is negatively associated with post-offer stock returns. Shroff, Sun, White 
and Zhang (2013) examine whether the pre-seasonal equity offerings (SEO) disclosures are 
associated with an unwarranted increase in the firm’s stock price, as evidenced by the association 
between pre-SEO good news disclosures and post-SEO abnormal returns. They find no evidence 
that pre-SEO good news forecasts or press releases are associated with post-SEO return reversal. 
In order to investigate whether my results are sensitive to firms’ equity offering decisions, 
in column 3, I exclude firms that are offering shares in the U.S. at the time of cross-listing.10 The 
results are qualitatively the same.11 The decline in valuation post cross-listing is mitigated by 
investor communication for firms that offer and do not offer shares at the time of cross-listing.  
In columns 7 to 9, I replicate the Tobin’s q results using contemporaneous annual stock 
returns as an alternative valuation measure. Results are consistent with the Tobin’s q regressions 
and suggest that investor communication significantly mitigates the decline in stock returns post 
cross-listing.  
Both the investor recognition and bonding hypothesis predict a decline in the cost of capital 
post cross-listing. In columns 4 to 6, I investigate whether investor communication is associated 
                                                 
10 Namely, Level III listings and 144A private placements. 
 
11 In untabulated tests, I also exclude all firm-years with stock issuances in the U.S. and in other markets greater than 
1% of firms’ shareholders’ equity. The results are qualitatively the same. 
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with this predicted decline. My results suggest that cross-listed firms with high U.S. investor 
communication scores experience a significant decline in cost of capital post cross-listing, but the 
same cannot be said about low communication firms. 
Given the positive association between investor communication in the home country and 
in the U.S. post cross-listing documented in table 3 panel C, U.S. investors may try to predict 
future U.S. communication practices of cross-listed firms by looking at their levels of 
communication with local investors prior to cross-listing. In table 4 panel B, I split the sample of 
2006-2013 cross-listings into high and low communication at home pre cross-listing subsamples. 
I use the number of corporate access events in the home country prior to cross-listing as a proxy 
for investor communication at home in that period. I find that firms that communicate at home but 
do not maintain the same levels of communication in the U.S. post cross-listing experience larger 
declines in valuation, measured by both Tobin’s q and annual stock returns. This result is consistent 
with these firms failing to fulfill U.S. investors’ expectations regarding their communication 
choices in the U.S. 
 
Valuation and Liquidity of Cross-listed Firms and Investor Communication Choices in the 
Long Run 
My main and second set of tests examine the relation between communication choices and 
the valuation and liquidity of cross-listed firms in the long run after cross-listing using the 
following specification: 
  Valuation or Liquidity Variableit= β0 + β1Investor Communication Scoreit + 𝛽2Equity Issuanceit 
                                                               + 𝛽3 International Salesit + 𝛽4 IFRSit +  𝛽5 Log Assetsit                
                                                                + β
6
 Sales Growthit + β
7
 ROAit+ β8 Leverageit 
                                                                +  Industry FEsi + Country FEsi + Year FEst + εit              (2) 
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I include industry, country, and year fixed effects. I choose not to include firm fixed effects 
for two reasons. First, since one of my main goals in this paper is to explain the cross-sectional 
variation in cross-listing benefits documented by prior literature, I choose to follow the 
specification in the majority of studies in the area. Second, given that my period of analysis is not 
extensive, many firms in my sample have few observations. In addition, communication choices 
are fairly sticky and do not vary much within firm.12 With few observations per unit and variables 
that vary little within each unit, relative to the amount of variation in the outcome variable, 
estimates of the within-unit effects may then diverge considerably from the true effect due to 
chance alone. Another related drawback of a firm fixed-effects model in my sample is that it 
requires the estimation of a parameter for each firm, i.e., 758 new parameters for a sample of 3,347 
observations. This can substantially reduce the model’s power and increase the standard errors of 
the coefficient estimates. 
Table 5 panel A column 1 presents the results from the estimation of (2) using Tobin’s q 
as a dependent variable. The investor communication factor is significantly and positively 
associated with the Tobin’s q ratio in the years after cross-listing.13, 14, 15 The results are also 
economically significant. For the average cross-listed firm in my sample, one standard deviation 
                                                 
12 Some communication choices are less sticky than others. The number of corporate access events tend to vary more 
within firm than, for example, the number of conference calls. In untabulated tests, I include firm fixed-effects to 
regressions of corporate access on valuation, cost of capital and liquidity and the results indicate that within-firm 
changes in the number of access events are associated with capital market benefits for cross-listed firms. 
 
13 My primary results are robust to the one-by-one exclusion of each of the main countries in my sample: namely, 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China and the United Kingdom. 
 
14 In untabulated tests, I include country-year fixed effects to control for time varying changes in country 
characteristics. The results are qualitatively the same. 
 
15 Since the communication variables are measured throughout the year, and the Tobin’s q is computed on the last day 




increase in the investor communication score is associated with a 7.2% increase in Tobin’s q. This 
coefficient is smaller but consistent with those of Karolyi and Liao (2015). Using the results of a 
2012 survey of Investor Relations officers, Karolyi and Liao (2015) find that more active IR 
programs are associated with a 12% higher Tobin’s q valuation ratio.  
The coefficient on investor communication also appears to be relevant when compared to 
the coefficients on the control variables usually included in cross-listing valuation studies. A one 
standard deviation increase in the investor communication score is associated with an average 0.12 
increase in Tobin’s q. On the other hand, a one standard deviation increase in the log of assets, a 
commonly used measure in the cross-listing literature, is associated with an average 0.10 decrease 
in Tobin’s q, and a one standard deviation increase in ROA is associated with an average 0.13 
decrease in Tobin’s q. These findings suggest that it is important to account for investor 
communication choices when analyzing the valuation effects of cross-listing. 
The economic magnitude of investor communication is also comparable to the magnitudes 
of coefficients in papers investigating the valuation effects of corporate governance in international 
settings. For example, Durnev and Kim (2005) find that a one standard deviation increase in their 
comprehensive governance score results in a 9% increase in Tobin’s q. Aggarwal et al. (2009) find 
that decreasing an average firm’s governance score by the average governance gap between an 
international firm and a matching U.S. firm would reduce Tobin’s q by 6.2%.  
Although investor communication activity is associated with an effect on firm value 
comparable to that of governance choices, one can find the size of the relationship surprisingly 
large. However, we must consider that the costs of such communication activities could be large 
and include costs of regulatory compliance, litigation risk, proprietary costs of disclosure and the 
indirect cost of executives’ time. Additionally, the effect of investor communication on firm value 
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is likely non-linear in firm size. In unreported tests, I run regression (2) by quartiles of total assets 
in USD and find that the association between investor communication and Tobin’s q is 
economically larger among small firms. For firms in the bottom two quartiles of size, a one-
standard-deviation increase in investor communication is associated with a 0.18 higher Tobin’s q 
or 11% of its unconditional mean (1.65). For firms in the top two quartiles by size, the equivalent 
result is a 0.04 higher Tobin’s q ratio or less than 3% of its mean (1.41). 
A potential concern about the documented association between investor communication 
and the valuation ratio of cross-listed firms is that it may reflect only the concurrent changes in 
firms’ growth opportunities that do not stem from communication, although communication may 
still be important in communicating these changes in opportunities to U.S. investors. Increased 
valuation can be a result of increased growth expectations, decreased cost of capital, or both. 
Economic theory and prior evidence would predict that greater voluntary disclosure and increased 
firm visibility through investor communication lowers the cost of capital. I find results consistent 
with these predictions. Specifically, results in Table 5 panel A column 2 indicate that investor 
communication choices are negatively associated with implied cost of capital.16 Although the 
effects of expected cash flows and cost of capital on firm value are hard to disentangle, the 
evidence on Table 5 suggests that at least a portion of the positive association between investor 
communication and valuation is due to decreased cost of capital as predicted by theory.17 
Increased stock liquidity is also a frequently mentioned benefit of cross-listing. I examine 
the relation between stock liquidity in the U.S. and investor communication of cross-listed firms. 
                                                 
16 I follow Karolyi and Liao (2015) and measure the implied cost of capital using the residual income valuation model 
of Claus and Thomas (2001) and analyst forecasts. 
 




Table 5 panel B presents the results of the regressions of turnover and bid-ask spreads on investor 
communication and a set of controls. Investor communication score is significantly and positively 
associated with share turnover in the years after cross-listing and negatively associated with 
average bid-ask spreads. For the average cross-listed firm in my sample, a one standard deviation 
increase in the investor communication score is associated with an 18% decrease in bid-ask spreads 
in the U.S. To provide some context, an increase of one standard deviation in the mean investor 
communication score represents going from a median of 0 to 2 corporate access events in the U.S. 
per year, from 0 to 4 conference calls in English, from 27 to 29 press releases in English and from 
0 to 1 management forecast. 
 
Institutional, Media, and Analyst Following: Path Analysis 
Given the evidence from prior literature on the association between investor recognition 
and the benefits of cross-listing, I analyze the relation between institutional, media, and analyst 
following and investor communication choices in the long run after cross-listing, using the 
following regression specification: 
  Following Variableit= β0 + β1 Investor Communication Scoreit + 𝛽2Equity Issuanceit 
                                         + 𝛽3 International Salesit + 𝛽4 IFRSit +  𝛽5 Log Assetsit                
                                           + β
6
 Sales Growthit + β
7
 ROAit+ β8 Leverageit 
                                           +  Industry FEsi + Country FEsi + Year FEst + εit                                (3)                                    
Table 5 panel B column 1 presents the estimated  β
1
 coefficients on investor 
communication from (3). The results indicate that the investor communication score is positively 
and significantly associated with the number of institutional investors, the number of media articles 
and the number of analysts following the firm. The results are also economically significant. One 
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standard deviation increase in the investor communication score is associated with an increase of 
5.9 U.S. institutional investors, 1.9 analysts and 5.7 media articles. 
After confirming that communication and analyst and institutional following are indeed 
positively associated, I verify whether institutional, media, and analyst following are positively 
associated with firm valuation and stock liquidity. Consistently with prior literature, I find that the 
number of U.S. institutional investors, media articles, and analysts following are positively related 
to Tobin’s q and liquidity of cross-listed firms.  
In addition to the analyst, media, and institutional following variables, I include the 
investor communication score as an explanatory variable in these regressions. This specification 
controls for institutional, media, and analyst following to examine whether communication has a 
direct effect on valuation and liquidity that is incremental to communication’s effect through 
analysts, media, and institutions. Table 5 panel B column 3 presents the coefficients on the investor 
communication variable in these regressions. The coefficients are significant in the regressions for 
Tobin’s q, cost of capital, and turnover, indicating a direct association between communication 
and these outcomes that does not depend on increases in following.  
Table 5 panel B presents a summary of the indirect, direct and total path estimates. An 
important caveat to path estimates using regressions is that it can only estimate nonrecursive 
models, i.e., unidirectional models without feedback loops or any reciprocal effects. In other 
words, this specification treats analyst, media, and institutional following as if they have a 
unidirectional causal effect on stock price and liquidity; however, analysts, media outlets, and 
investors may be responding to prices and liquidity levels as well. Thus, I can only conclude from 
these models that the contemporaneous outcomes tend to be associated with each other not that 
one outcome causes another. 
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With this caveat in mind, the results in panel B suggest that investor communication has a 
direct and indirect association with Tobin’s q and share turnover, through institutional, media, and 
analyst following, a direct and indirect association with cost of capital, and an indirect association 
with bid-ask spreads. The indirect associations with cost of capital and bid-ask spreads happen 
through analyst following, but not through institutional ownership and media coverage. Overall, 
results are consistent with analyst following being the channel that links investor communication 
to reduced levels of information asymmetry and cost of capital for cross-listed firms.  
 
Investor Communication and Likelihood of Delisting 
 Firms that cross-list, do not communicate with U.S. investors and, therefore, do not achieve 
the full benefits of cross-listing may be more likely to delist from the U.S. market. In table 5 panel 
C, I investigate whether firms with lower investor communication in the U.S. are more likely to 
delist in the future. The results are consistent with this prediction, cross-listed firms with lower 
investor communication score are more likely to eventually delist from the U.S. 
 
Cross-sectional Tests 
The relation between investor communication and valuation may vary by country and firm 
characteristics. Certain barriers to foreign investment, such as levels of corruption or cultural 
distance, cannot be lifted by management; such barriers can prevent communication choices from 
affecting cross-listing outcomes significantly. Conversely, it is possible that individual firms’ 
communication strategies are not very effective in the presence of significant cultural differences 
and high perceived corruption levels. Furthermore, non-U.S. firms can list in the U.S. through 
different types of listings. These different types of listings have different disclosure and 
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governance requirements, which can, in turn, affect the relation between investor communication 
and firm valuation. 
 
Cultural Distance 
In order to investigate how the relation between communication and the valuation of cross-
listed firms varies by country characteristics, I start by partitioning the sample between firms from 
countries with high and low cultural distance. Cultural distance scores are measured as the average 
of the differences in the scores for Hofstede’s six cultural dimensions between the U.S. and the 
firm’s country. The six dimensions are the power distance index, individualism versus 
collectivism, the uncertainty avoidance index, masculinity versus femininity, long-term orientation 
versus short-term orientation, and indulgence versus restraint. Firms from countries with cultural 
distance scores greater than the sample median are considered high cultural distance firms. 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 6 present the results. Investor communication is positively and 
significantly associated with the valuation of cross-listed firms in both subsamples. However, this 
association is more positive for firms from countries with less cultural distance from the U.S., 
consistent with the idea that cultural distance could decrease the effectiveness of communication. 
 
Language 
 On the one hand, language barriers can increase U.S. investors’ costs in processing firm 
disclosures made in the local language, thus increasing the benefits of investor communication in 
English for firms from countries where English is not the official language. On the other hand, 
language barriers can also decrease the effectiveness of communication if managers are not fluent 
in English. Using transcripts from non-U.S. firms’ English conference calls, Brochet, Naranjo, and 
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Yu (2016) find that the calls of firms in countries with greater language barriers are more likely to 
contain non-plain English and erroneous expressions, and that calls with a greater use of non-plain 
English and erroneous expressions show lower capital market responses. 
 Lundholm, Rogo, and Zhang (2014) examine the readability of text and the use of numbers 
in the annual filings and earnings press releases of foreign firms listed on U.S. stock exchanges. 
They find that cross-listed firms tend to write clearer text and present more numerical data than 
their U.S. firm counterparts, suggesting that cross-listed firms may use clearer written disclosures 
in an attempt to overcome U.S. investors’ home bias. 
In table 6 panel A columns 3 and 4, I partition the sample between firms from countries 
where English is the official language and countries where English is not the official language. 
The coefficient on investor communication is positive and significant in both subsamples, and 
although larger for the non-English subgroup, the difference is not statistically significant. 
Perceived Corruption 
Corruption risk may also represent a barrier to foreign investment and affect the association 
between communication and firm valuation. I measure this factor using the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI). The WGI control of corruption score captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. Firms from countries 
with below median scores of control of corruption are classified as firms from high corruption 
countries. Columns 5 and 6 in Table 6 panel A present the results. Investor communication is 
statistically associated with the valuation of firms from countries with low and high perceived 
corruption levels. However, this association is more positive for firms from countries with lower 
levels of perceived corruption, consistent with the idea that perceptions of corruption could 
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decrease the effectiveness of communication. In conclusion, the association of investor 
communication and valuation in my sample is higher for cross-listed firms from countries with 
lower perceived corruption and smaller cultural distance from the U.S., suggesting that 




 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) provide evidence that common 
law countries have more investor protection rights, which could reduce the home bias against firms 
from common law countries and decrease the potential benefits from communication. Conversely, 
better investor protections could increase the credibility of voluntary communication activities.  
 In table 6 panel A columns 7 and 8, I split my sample of cross-listings into firms from 
countries with common and code legal traditions.  The coefficient on investor communication is 
positive and significant in both subsamples, and although larger for the code-law subgroup, the 
difference is not statistically significant. 
 
Level of Listing 
The relation between investor communication and valuation may also vary by listing 
characteristics. I divide my sample between firms that are listed in the U.S. over the counter and 
on an exchange. Exchange-listed firms are subject to additional disclosure requirements and 
potentially higher SEC scrutiny. I classify firms that cross-listed in the U.S. through a Level II or 
Level III ADR program as exchange-listed firms. These firms are required to file an F-6 
registration statement and the SEC Form 20-F and to comply with the SEC’s other disclosure rules, 
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including submission of its annual report, which must be prepared in accordance with U.S. 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) or International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). Compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley is also required. These compliances include 
certifications by management regarding the effectiveness of the company's internal controls over 
financial reporting and disclosure controls, as well as procedures related to annual reports filed on 
Form 20-F.  
Level I ADRs involve the filing of an F-6 registration statement but allow for exemption 
under Rule 12g3-2(b)18 from full SEC reporting requirements. For Canadian firms, which do not 
need an ADR program to cross-list in the U.S., I code firms as exchange-listed if their stock trades 
at NYSE or NASDAQ according to Compustat. Canadian firms are exempt from U.S. reporting 
requirements because of the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System. This system essentially 
acknowledges that disclosure requirements among the two countries are highly comparable. 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 6 panel B present the results. The regression coefficients suggest 
that the association between communication and firm valuation varies by the level of cross-
listing.19 Investor communication is statistically and positively associated with the valuation of 
both groups of firms, but the association is more positive for exchange-listed companies. This 
could be due to the fact that, as a result of more stringent disclosure requirements, exchange-listed 
                                                 
18 Rule 12g3-2(b) provides foreign private issuers with an exemption from the stringent SEC registration and reporting 
requirements. In order to gain exemption, a company must publish all material shareholder communication (press 
releases, annual reports, etc.) on a timely basis, in English on its corporate website. The company's shares or debt 
instruments must be not already registered under the Exchange Act, and the company must have a “primary trading 
market” (i.e., it must maintain a listing in one or two jurisdictions outside the U.S. where more than 55% of the 
worldwide trading occurs). OTC cross-listed firms are still subject to Rule 10b-5 and the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act. 
 




firms have better information environments and higher accounting quality information, which 
increases the credibility of voluntary communication. This would be consistent with the findings 
in Lang et al. (2003b) that suggest that non-U.S. firms cross-listed in U.S. exchanges have higher 
accounting quality than non-U.S. firms cross-listed over the counter. 
 
Communication of Good and Bad News 
The association between investor communication and valuation may vary according to the 
type of news being communicated. In order to investigate how my study’s results differ in 
accordance with different news content, I divide my sample into good and bad news firm-years. 
To determine whether a firm is, on average, communicating good or bad news during the year I 
use the average composite sentiment (CSS) of the firm-initiated press releases disclosed during the 
year according to RavenPack.20 Only firm-years with at least two firm-initiated press releases in 
RavenPack are part of these tests.  
Table 6 panel B columns 3 and 4 present the results. Investor communication is positively 
associated with Tobin’s q for both good and bad news firm-years and the difference in coefficients 
is not statistically significant. This result helps to alleviate concerns that investor communication 
is positively related only to the valuation of cross-listed firms with good news.  
 
                                                 
20  I follow Bushman et al. (2016) in using the Composite Sentiment Score (CSS) provided by Ravenpack to categorize 
news stories as positive, neutral or negative. The CSS score ranges from 0 to 100, with values below 50 indicating 
negative news, values equal to 50 indicating neutral news and values greater than 50 indicating positive news. The 
CSS score is the combination of five proprietary sentiment measures that combine textual analysis (identifying 
emotionally charged words and phrases), expert categorization of topics likely to cause positive or negative short-term 
market reaction, and an algorithm that ensures agreement among the five sentiment measures. Detailed definitions of 




 Modeling the Decision to Communicate using Instrumental Variables 
Firms in my sample have self-selected to communicate with investors. This may raise the 
concern that a self-section bias might impact the empirical results. The relation between firms’ 
levels of investor communication and Tobin’s q and liquidity could reflect an omitted-variables 
problem: some unobservable firm attribute may affect a firm’s investor communication as well as 
the firm’s value and stock liquidity. In an attempt to alleviate this concern, I model the firms’ 
decision to communicate with investors using an instrumental variables approach. 
I model the corporate access decision because this is arguably the most costly investor 
communication activity in my study and it is strongly correlated with other communication 
choices, i.e., firms that decide to attend corporate access events in the U.S. also tend to disseminate 
more press releases in English, hold more conference calls with foreign investors, and disclose 
more guidance. In addition, costs of attending corporate access events in the U.S. vary for the firms 
in my sample. For example, it is less costly for a manager located in Canada to travel to the U.S. 
than it is for a manager located in China. I explore this variation using the availability of direct 
flights between firms’ headquarters and New York City. A good instrument would be related to 
the level of investor communication a firm decides to have, but uncorrelated with unobservable 
firm characteristics linked to valuation and liquidity. Direct flight availability is related to 
managers’ time, which is arguably the largest cost of providing corporate access but should not 
otherwise be related to Tobin’s, cost of capital, turnover and bid-ask spreads.  
To calculate the availability of direct flights, I follow Giroud (2013) and use data from the 
T-100 Segment Database from the U.S. Department of Transportation. To get headquarters 
location information, I use the ADDRESS CITY variable from Datastream. When the address is 
missing or the country of address and the country of headquarters do not match, I hand-collect 
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headquarters’ city location from the company’s website. I then get latitudes and longitudes for the 
headquarters’ city and for the airports in the T-100 Database, and I code the availability of a direct 
flight equal to one when there is a direct flight to JFK, La Guardia or Newark leaving from an 
airport less than 50 miles away from the headquarters’ city. I choose New York City airports as 
my main destination because over 50% of the U.S. corporate access events in my sample are held 
in this location. Therefore, I assume that having a direct flight to an NYC airport would impact the 
cost of meeting with most of U.S. investors and analysts.21  
I estimate two-stage least square regressions (2SLS) using the availability of direct flights 
as sources of plausibly exogenous variation in the number of corporate access held in the U.S. as 
well as in the overall investor communication score. Table 7 panel A presents the results. Within 
country, within industry, and within year, direct flight availability is significantly and positively 
associated with cross-listed firms’ decision to communicate with investors, using both the 
communication score and the number of corporate access events in the U.S. The F-statistics for 
the significance of Direct Flights indicate that the instrument have significant additional 
explanatory power over the other control variables included. Stock and Yogo’s tests reject the null 
that the instrument is weak.  
The second-stage regression results are consistent with my primary findings and indicate 
that U.S. investor communication is positively associated with the Tobin’s q and share turnover of 
cross-listed firms, and negatively associated with cost of capital and bid-ask spreads. Since the 
availability of direct flights may be related to the time-varying levels of trade and foreign direct 
                                                 
21 My results are robust, although somewhat weaker, to the inclusion of directs flights between firms’ headquarters 




investment in a country, I control for the country-year levels of foreign direct investment and 
exports and imports to the U.S. 
Most firms in my sample do not experience changes in the availability of direct flights 
during my sample period. As a result, the variation in my regressions comes mostly from 
differences in direct flight availability across firms within a country. To provide some validity to 
the claim that firms increase (decrease) communication with U.S. investors when direct flights are 
initiated (terminated), in panel B I provide univariate evidence of average increases (decreases) in 
communication for the 53 (29) firms that experienced initiations (terminations) of direct flights 
during my sample period. The differences between the number of corporate access events in the 
U.S. and overall investor communication scores pre and post the initiation or termination are both 
significantly different from zero, indicating that within-firm changes in direct flight availability to 
NYC are associated with changes in investor communication in the predicted directions. 
Although the first and second-stage regressions and univariate results provide evidence 
consistent with investor communication increasing valuation of cross-listed firms, it is important 
to note some caveats of direct flights as an instrument in this setting. Direct flights to the U.S. 
could be a proxy for economic mass of investment and trade between U.S. and other countries. I 
attempt to control for mass investment and trade by including in the regressions variables such as 
foreign direct investment and imports and exports between the U.S. and the firm’s country. 
However, these country-level time-varying variables may not fully capture the matching between 




Communication with U.S. versus Local Investors 
U.S. investors may worry about being in informational disadvantage in relation to local 
investors when investing in non-U.S. firms. Consistently with this rationale, Bohn and Tesar 
(1996) and Brennan and Cao (1997) find that U.S. investors chase returns, do not rebalance their 
international portfolios, and are at an informational disadvantage when they invest abroad. 
Communication focused on U.S. investors can reduce information asymmetry between local and 
foreign investors, positively affecting firm valuation and stock liquidity.  
In table 8 panel A, I investigate whether the proportion of corporate access events held in 
the home country versus in the U.S. is associated with the valuation and liquidity of cross-listed 
firms. For this set of sets, I restrict the sample to firms that held at least one corporate access event 
in the U.S. and in the home country during the year. Results suggest that cross-listed firms that 
hold more access events in the home country, in comparison to the U.S., have lower valuations 
and higher cost of capital. U.S. investors may perceive their information risk to be larger for these 
firms, leading them to discount these stocks more heavily. Given that the U.S. stock market is the 
largest in the world, it is plausible that U.S. investors’ perceived information disadvantage can 
significantly affect the valuation of non-U.S. firms. 
 
Falsification Tests 
Assuming that local investors will tend to trade in the home market and U.S. investors will 
tend to trade in the U.S., I perform falsification regressions of investor communication in the U.S. 
on liquidity in the home market, and communication in the home market on liquidity in the U.S. 
Table 8 panel B presents the results. None of the communication coefficients are statistically 
significant. These results partially mitigate omitted correlated variable concerns regarding the 
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firms’ decision to communicate with any type of investors, regardless of their nationality. It does 
not, however, mitigate concerns about firms’ reasons to communicate with U.S. investors in 
particular. 
 
 Initiation and Termination of Investor Communication Activities 
In order to shed some light on whether firms experience increases (decreases) in valuation 
and liquidity when they start (stop) using each of the communication channels in this study, I look 
at average changes in valuation and liquidity pre and post the initiation and termination of investor 
communication activities. For this set of tests, I focus on the subsample of firms that started or 
stopped holding corporate access events in the U.S., conference calls in English, press releases in 
English or management forecasts during the sample period. 
Table 9 presents the results. I find that cross-listed firms experience average increases 
(decreases) in Tobin's’ q when they start (stop) participating in corporate access events in the U.S. 
and disseminating press releases in English. They also experience decreases (increases) in cost of 
capital when they start (stop) holding conference calls in English and disseminating English press 
releases. Turnover in the U.S. increases (decreases) when cross-listed firms start (stop) holding 
conference calls in English and disclosing management forecasts. Bid-ask spreads in the U.S. 
decreases (increases) when firms start (stop) participating in corporate access events in the U.S. 
and disseminating press releases in English. 
Overall, evidence from these tests suggests that the initiation of investor communication 
activities focused on U.S. investors are positively related to cross-listed firms’ valuation and 




 Valuation Premium of Cross-listed Firms Relative to Non-cross-listed Firm 
Most papers in the cross-listing literature investigate the valuation premium of cross-listed 
firms relative to non-cross-listed firms. The idea is that absent cross-listing, both groups of firms 
should be valued similarly. To maintain consistency with these studies, in my next series of tests 
I include a matched sample of non-cross-listed firms. Firm-years are matched based on country, 
industry, and closeness in size, measured by total assets in U.S. dollars. In order to reduce the 
number of cross-listed firms excluded due to missing matches, I match cross-listed and non-cross-
listed firms with repetition. 
I start by investigating how the valuation premium of cross-listed relative to non-cross-
listed firms varies after cross-listing, controlling for investor communication choices. Table 10 
panel A presents the results of regressions of Tobin’s q on XLISTED, an indicator variable equal 
to one if the firm is a cross-listed firm; investor communication dummies; the investor 
communication score and a set of control variables in the years after cross-listing. The coefficient 
on XLISTED in column 1 indicates that cross-listed firms are valued at a premium relative to non-
cross-listed firms from the same country and industry. This finding is consistent with the pervasive 
evidence in the cross-listing literature (Karolyi 1998, 2006). 
Columns 2 to 6 in Table 10 panel A add dummies for investor communication choices, and 
column 7 adds the investor communication score variable. The control variables have the same 
magnitudes, signs, and statistical significance. However, the estimated valuation premium of 
cross-listed firms relative to non-cross-listed firms is reduced around 51% after I control for 
communication choice dummies. For instance, the estimated coefficient on XLISTED goes from 
0.121 to 0.059 after I control for the decision to provide corporate access, to 0.075 after I control 
for the decision to provide a conference call, and to 0.059 after I control for the decision to 
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disseminate a press release. Column 6 presents the result from a regression including all 
communication choices, and column 7 presents the result including the investor communication 
score. The coefficient on XLISTED drops to 0.02 and is no longer statistically significant. 
Coefficients on the dummies for corporate access and press releases remain positive and 
statistically significant. The change in the magnitude and statistical significance of XLISTED 
suggests that controlling for communication choices explains much of the unexplained valuation 
premium. Put differently, it appears that a significant portion of the premium in the valuation of 
cross-listed companies is attributed to increased communication.  
In order to further investigate whether cross-listed firms that do not communicate with 
investors are valued at a premium relative to non-cross-listed firms, I classify firms using at least 
one of the four communication channels during the year as communicating firms. I then partition 
the sample into four comparison groups: i) cross-listed communicating firms and non-cross-listed 
non-communicating firms, ii) cross-listed communicating firms and non-cross-listed 
communicating firms, iii) cross-listed non-communicating firms and non-cross-listed non-
communicating firms, and iv) cross-listed non-communicating firms and non-cross-listed 
communicating firms. Table 10 panel B presents the results.  
Findings suggest that cross-listed firms that do not communicate with investors are not 
valued at a premium relative to non-cross-listed firms. When both groups of firms communicate 
with investors, cross-listed firms are still valued at a premium relative to non-cross-listed firms, 
which suggests that cross-listing does benefit firms as long as they communicate with investors. 
In summary, these results suggest that when comparing the valuation of cross-listed firms relative 
to non-cross-listed firms, researchers should be aware of and try to control for differences in the 




Product Market Benefits of Cross-Listing and Investor Communication 
 Survey evidence suggests that some managers cross-list their companies’ shares for 
product-market reasons (Mittoo 1992; Bancel and Mittoo 2001; King and Mittoo 2007). Cross-
listings can increase the firms’ international visibility and help the product identification and the 
marketing efforts in foreign markets.  Cross-listing may also help to improve the relationship with 
the government and financial community of the foreign country of listing (Mittoo 1992). 
In untabulated tests, I find that cross-listed firms’ international sales increase after cross-
listing and that this increase is significantly larger for cross-listed firms that communicate more 
with U.S. investors. In unreported cross-sectional tests, I also find that the association between 
investor communication and valuation is stronger for cross-listed firms with a higher proportion 
of international to total sales. These findings suggest that cross-listed firms with more foreign sales 
benefit more from communication with U.S. investors. Overall, these preliminary results suggest 
that investor communication can be a channel through which firms achieve not only capital market 







In this study, I investigate whether communication with U.S. investors helps non-U.S. 
firms maintain the capital market benefits of U.S. listings. I argue that foreign firms that do not 
meet the expectations of U.S. investors and analysts regarding the frequency and form of corporate 
communication may not be able to keep the benefits of a U.S. listing.  I posit that the management 
communication strategies of non-U.S. firms focused on U.S. audiences are related to cross-listed 
firms’ success in maintaining higher levels of liquidity and valuation post cross-listing. 
This study demonstrates that investor communication mitigates the post cross-listing 
decline in valuation documented by prior studies. Communication choices also explain variation 
in the valuation, cost of capital, and stock liquidity of cross-listed firms from the same country in 
the long run. In addition, firms that cross-list but do not communicate with U.S. investors are more 
likely to delist from the U.S. in subsequent years. These findings are robust to concerns about 
potential endogeneity, as I model investor communication choices using the availability of direct 
flights between headquarters and the U.S.  
Lastly, I compare the valuation of cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms. My findings 
suggest that a significant portion of the cross-listing valuation premium is associated with the 
investor communication practices of these firms. Firms that cross-list in the U.S. but do not 
communicate with U.S. investors are not valued at a premium relative to non-cross-listed firms 
from the same country. In general, my empirical findings indicate that investor communication is 
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an important condition for firms to achieve the long-run benefits of cross-listing. My results also 
suggest that investor communication is an important factor in explaining the valuation of cross-
listed firms, and it should be taken into consideration in analyzing the valuation premium of cross-
listed firms relative to non-cross-listed firms. 
Prior literature suggests that success in building a larger U.S. investor base, media 
coverage, and analyst following is related to cross-listing valuation effects. My findings extend 
and elaborate on existing research, accounting specifically for the role of communication choices 
in U.S. cross-listing outcomes. 
My measures of communication take into account the choice of channels and their 
frequency but not the quality of communication. Thus, future research could use textual analysis 
to measure the rigor and responsiveness with which managers of cross-listed firms answer 
questions from analysts in conference call transcripts. Responsiveness could then be used as a 
more granular measure of the quality of the communication efforts of cross-listed firms with U.S. 

















Figure 1 - Mean Tobin’s q around Cross-Listing for High and Low Communication Firms 
 
  
Figure 1 presents the average Tobin’s q around cross-listing for firms in the lower and upper quartiles of investor communication. 
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Table 1 - Sample Selection 
    
  Firm-years Firms 
Sample of sponsored cross-listings between 2006-2013 according to Depositary Banks and SEC filings 7,739  959 
Firm-years without necessary data in Datastream (total assets,  liabilities, non-negative shareholders’ equity, sales, net income, 
and market value of equity) 
(4,422) (402) 
Subtotal 3,317  557  
 
  
Older cross-listings from the same country, from the same industry and of similar size with necessary data in Datastream  
(with replacement) 
1,265  247 
Non-cross-listed firm-years from the same country, from the same industry and of similar size with necessary data in Datastream 
(with replacement) 
2,301  423 
Final sample 6,883  1,227  
Table 1 details the sample selection process and is discussed in section 3.1. The list of cross-listed firms was obtained from Edgar 20-F and 6-K filings and from 
the Bank of New York, Citibank and JP Morgan lists of ADRs. Cross-listing dates are collected from the depositary banks’ lists and from CRSP. Financial and 
price data are from Datastream. Cross-listings from 2006 to 2013 are matched with replacement to a sample of non-cross-listed (domestic) firm-years from the 
same country, from the same industry and of similar size, measured by total assets in U.S. dollars, and to a sample of firms cross-listed prior to 2006 from the 




Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics 
PANEL A: Summary Statistics                             
  2006-2013  
Cross-listings 


















Test Variable Mean Median  Mean Median   Mean Median  
Corporate Access US 0.645 0.000  0.401 0.000  -0.244 *** 0.000   0.068 0.000  -0.576 *** 0.000  
DCorporate Access US 0.232 0.000  0.145 0.000  -0.087 *** 0.000   0.032 0.000  -0.200 *** 0.000  
Conference Calls 1.628 1.000  1.345 0.000  -0.283 *** -1.000 ***  0.425 0.000  -1.203 *** -1.000 *** 
DConference Calls 0.525 1.000  0.413 0.000  -0.112 *** -1.000 ***  0.165 0.000  -0.360 *** -1.000 *** 
Nr. of Press Releases 14.371 1.000  18.128 0.000  3.757 ** -1.000 **  2.100 0.000  -12.271 *** -1.000 *** 
DPress Release 0.553 1.000  0.489 0.000  -0.064 *** -1.000 ***  0.194 0.000  -0.359 *** -1.000 *** 
Management Forecast 0.744 0.000  0.669 0.000  -0.076  0.000   0.049 0.000  -0.696 *** 0.000  
DManagement Forecast 0.228 0.000  0.186 0.000  -0.042 *** 0.000   0.031 0.000  -0.197 *** 0.000  
Nr. US Inst. Investors 11.375 0.000  20.113 0.000  8.738 *** 0.000   2.109 0.000  -9.266 *** 0.000  
Perc. US Instit. 0.023 0.000  0.028 0.000  0.005 * 0.000   0.006 0.000  -0.017 *** 0.000  
Tobin’s q 1.641 1.258  1.550 1.180  -0.091 *** -0.078 ***  1.515 1.174  -0.126 *** -0.084 *** 
Turnover in the U.S. 0.630 0.011  0.452 0.034  -0.178 *** 0.023 **  NA NA  NA  NA  
Avg. Spread in the U.S. 0.017 0.007  0.013 0.007  -0.004 ** 0.000   NA NA  NA  NA  
Log of Assets (in USD) 13.605 13.681  13.531 13.655  -0.074  -0.026   12.554 12.617  -1.051 *** -1.063 *** 
Sales Growth 0.272 0.107  0.237 0.089  -0.035  -0.018 ***  0.185 0.078  -0.087 *** -0.029 *** 
ROA -0.040 0.025  -0.041 0.022  0.000  -0.002   -0.025 0.027  0.016 ** 0.002  
Leverage 0.480 0.460  0.498 0.485  0.017 ** 0.026 **  0.497 0.485  0.017 *** 0.025 *** 
Analyst Following 9.297 6.000  6.680 3.000  -2.617 *** -3.000 ***  3.755 1.000  -5.542 *** -5.000 *** 
Local Index Participant 0.389 0.000  0.344 0.000  -0.045 ** 0.000   0.254 0.000  -0.135 *** 0.000  
Exchange Cross-listing 0.235 0.000  0.263 0.000  0.029  0.000   NA NA  NA  NA  
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the samples of 2006-2013 cross-listings, matched prior to 2006 cross-listings and matched non-cross-listed firm-years.  All variables are 




Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics 
PANEL B: Observations by Country 
Country Firm-years % 
Argentina 105 1.5% 
Australia 1,003 14.6% 
Belgium 48 0.7% 
Brazil 496 7.2% 
Canada 551 8.0% 
Chile 5 0.1% 
China 845 12.3% 
Colombia 42 0.6% 
Cyprus 7 0.1% 
Denmark 87 1.3% 
Egypt 22 0.3% 
France 241 3.5% 
Germany 258 3.8% 
Greece 84 1.2% 
Hong Kong 285 4.1% 
India 237 3.4% 
Ireland 36 0.5% 
Israel 207 3.0% 
Italy 45 0.7% 
Japan 401 5.8% 
Kuwait 18 0.3% 
Luxembourg 8 0.1% 
Malaysia 45 0.7% 
Mexico 45 0.7% 
Netherlands 69 1.0% 
New Zealand 55 0.8% 
Norway 71 1.0% 
Pakistan 93 1.4% 
Peru 15 0.2% 
Philippines 47 0.7% 
Russia 349 5.1% 
Singapore 26 0.4% 
South Africa 69 1.0% 
South Korea 113 1.6% 
Spain 27 0.4% 
Sweden 78 1.1% 
Switzerland 36 0.5% 
Taiwan 80 1.2% 
United Arab Emirates 18 0.3% 
United Kingdom 616 9.0% 
Total 6,883 100% 
Panel B provides the number of firm-year observations per country for the full sample 
of cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms.
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Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics 
PANEL C: Correlation Matrix                       
 
        
  Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1) Cross-listed 1 0.23 0.11 0.33 0.25 0.34 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.04 0.01 -0.06 0.20 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.31 
(2) Corp. Access US 0.18 1 0.33 0.45 0.34 0.35 0.17 0.17 0.25 0.11 0.23 -0.10 0.08 0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.29 
(3) Corp. Access Home 0.09 0.37 1 0.29 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.24 0.05 -0.01 -0.11 0.15 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.10 
(4) Conference Calls 0.32 0.38 0.25 1 0.40 0.50 0.23 0.23 0.44 0.04 0.34 -0.09 0.35 0.02 0.09 0.12 0.29 
(5) Manag. Forecast 0.20 0.27 0.09 0.32 1 0.39 0.15 0.15 0.36 0.03 0.41 -0.10 0.17 0.02 0.07 -0.00 0.30 
(6) Log Press Releases 0.31 0.29 0.19 0.46 0.34 1 0.25 0.25 0.37 0.07 0.33 -0.10 0.32 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.33 
(7) Perc. Institutions 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.19 0.16 0.21 1 1.00 0.15 0.02 0.27 -0.12 0.21 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.30 
(8) # Institutions 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.19 0.10 0.27 0.69 1 0.15 0.03 0.27 -0.14 0.22 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.30 
(9) # Analysts 0.26 0.20 0.22 0.37 0.26 0.40 0.15 0.16 1 0.13 0.11 -0.51 0.56 0.09 0.28 0.16 0.13 
(10) Tobin’s q 0.04 0.10 0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 1 0.05 -0.27 -0.14 0.07 0.17 -0.01 0.02 
(11) Turnover U.S. . 0.09 -0.04 0.21 0.41 0.25 0.20 0.13 0.11 0.07 1 -0.28 -0.05 0.05 0.06 -0.05 0.64 
(12) Avg. Spread U.S. . -0.09 -0.04 -0.15 -0.06 -0.15 -0.14 -0.21 -0.32 -0.13 -0.21 1 -0.54 -0.16 -0.36 -0.18 -0.07 
(13) Log of Assets 0.20 0.07 0.16 0.33 0.10 0.36 0.10 0.25 0.56 -0.23 -0.07 -0.36 1 0.06 0.29 0.43 0.10 
(14) Sales Growth 0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.06 -0.05 0.02 1 0.19 0.01 0.02 
(15) ROA -0.03 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.20 -0.19 0.07 -0.24 0.41 0.04 1 -0.06 0.01 
(16) Leverage -0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.08 -0.04 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.14 -0.00 -0.01 -0.13 0.32 -0.03 -0.09 1 -0.03 
(17) Exchange Xlisting 0.31 0.24 0.08 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.28 0.32 0.13 0.02 0.31 -0.04 0.12 0.01 0.05 -0.03 1 
Panel C provides correlations for the pooled sample of cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms. Pearson (Spearman) correlations are presented below (above) the diagonal. Correlations 




Table 3 - Investor Communication Choices 
PANEL A: Characteristics of Cross-listed Firm-years by Investor Communication Choices 
 
Not using any of 






conference calls  
(N=2,263) 
Disclosing 
press releases  
(N=2,453) 
Disclosing 
management forecasts  
(N=991) 
Using all four 
channels  
(N=364) 
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Corporate Access US 0.00 2.78 1.05 0.90 1.38 3.29 
DCorporate Access US 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.31 0.43 1.00 
Conference Calls 0.00 2.99 3.14 2.22 2.73 3.60 
DConference Call 0.00 0.86 1.00 0.70 0.81 1.00 
Press Releases 0.00 30.27 26.71 28.78 28.38 35.99 
DPress Release 0.00 0.80 0.75 1.00 0.82 1.00 
Management Forecasts 0.00 1.62 1.15 1.13 3.35 3.67 
DManagement Forecast 0.00 0.44 0.35 0.33 1.00 1.00 
Log of Assets (in USD) 12.37 13.83 14.51 14.19 14.29 14.19 
Nr. US Inst. Investors 2.73 27.92 21.46 20.02 22.18 27.32 
Analyst Following 4.33 11.72 11.84 11.09 14.70 15.80 
Sales Growth 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.26 0.19 0.19 
ROA -0.10 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 
Leverage 0.43 0.46 0.53 0.50 0.48 0.45 
 
    PANEL B: Factor Analysis of Investor Communication Choices of Cross-Listed Firms (Investor Communication Score) 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative   Variable Factor 1 Uniqueness Scoring Coefficients 
Factor1 1.955 1.179 0.489 0.489   Access US 0.651 0.577 0.33263 
Factor2 0.776 0.052 0.194 0.683   Conference Calls 0.767 0.412 0.39192 
Factor3 0.724 0.178 0.181 0.864   Log Number PR 0.734 0.461 0.37534 
Factor4 0.546 . 0.136 1.000   Management Forecasts 0.636 0.596 0.32497 
Panel A presents the average characteristics of cross-listed firm-years using each of the investor communication channels. Means for the investor communication dummies 
show the proportion of firm-years that used both of the channels. Panel B presents the results of factor analysis using the four communication variables and the scoring 
coefficients used to construct the investor communication score.
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Table 3 - Investor Communication Choices 
PANEL C: Determinants of the Decision of Cross-Listed Firms to Communicate with 
U.S. Investors 
      Inv. Comm. Score 
    Prediction (1) (2) 
Corporate Access Home   + 0.228*** 0.234*** 
      (0.026) (0.027) 
Equity Issuance   + 0.169*** 0.189*** 
      (0.037) (0.040) 
Exchange Cross-Listing   + 0.416*** 0.663*** 
      (0.094) (0.072) 
IFRS   + 0.078** 0.345*** 
      (0.039) (0.060) 
International Sales Ratio   + 0.134* 0.220*** 
      (0.079) (0.078) 
Log of Assets   + 0.112*** 0.108*** 
      (0.016) (0.018) 
Lead Asset Growth   + 0.007 0.007 
      (0.010) (0.010) 
Lead Earnings Growth   + 0.004* 0.002 
      (0.003) (0.003) 
ROA   + -0.068 0.032 
      (0.054) (0.061) 
Leverage   - -0.016 0.007 
      (0.095) (0.097) 
High Cultural Distance   -   -0.243*** 
        (0.081) 
English   +   0.191* 
        (0.101) 
High Corruption   +/-   0.234*** 
        (0.054) 
Common Law   +/-   -0.463*** 
        (0.090) 
Constant     -2.862*** -2.771*** 
      (0.216) (0.282) 
Fixed Effects 






N     
3,661 3,661 
R-squared     0.564 0.448 
Panel A presents results for the regressions of the investor communication score on firm and country characteristics 
for the sample of cross-listed firms. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are presented in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Variables are described in Appendix I. 
Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.
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Table 4 - Capital Market Benefits and Investor Communication Around Cross-Listing 
    
PANEL A: Investor Communication and the Decline in Valuation Post Cross-Listing 
    Tobin's q   Cost of Capital   Annual Stock Returns 
    




Issuing Shares in 
the U.S. at the time 
of Cross-Listing  
  




Issuing Shares in 
the U.S. at the time 
of Cross-Listing  
  




Issuing Shares in 
the U.S. at the time 
of Cross-Listing 
  Pred. (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
Post - , + , - -0.084* -0.113** -0.149** 
 
-0.006 0.002 0.005 
 
-0.117*** -0.155*** -0.167*** 
    (0.054) (0.061) (0.068) 
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
 
(0.042) (0.046) (0.052) 
Post×High 
Comm. 
































  0.223*** 0.173*** 0.153*** 
 
-0.008 -0.007 -0.001 
 
0.189*** 0.188*** 0.194*** 
  (0.036) (0.036) (0.045) 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.034) 
International  
Sales 
  0.173*** 0.210*** 0.221*** 
 
0.021** 0.021** 0.026** 
 
0.071 0.073 0.039 
  (0.061) (0.061) (0.067) 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.050) 
IFRS 
  
  -0.073 -0.083 -0.026 
 
-0.028** -0.027** -0.038** 
 
-0.146** -0.149*** -0.094 
  (0.068) (0.065) (0.081) 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) 
 
(0.058) (0.058) (0.073) 
Log of  
Assets 
  -0.122*** -0.112*** -0.117*** 
 
-0.023*** -0.022*** -0.024*** 
 
-0.016* -0.012 -0.014 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Sales  
Growth 
  0.048** 0.011 0.000 
 
0.020*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 
 
0.080*** 0.080*** 0.058** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) 
ROA 
  
  -0.522*** -0.517*** -0.638*** 
 
-0.251*** -0.245*** -0.201*** 
 
0.461*** 0.455*** 0.419*** 
  (0.111) (0.116) (0.120) 
 
(0.056) (0.056) (0.068) 
 
(0.058) (0.058) (0.059) 
Leverage 
  
  0.201** 0.260*** 0.389*** 
 
0.040** 0.040** 0.054*** 
 
-0.031 -0.031 -0.084 
  (0.088) (0.089) (0.100) 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020) 
 
(0.066) (0.066) (0.069) 
Constant 
  
  2.836*** 2.756*** 2.718*** 
 
0.723*** 0.718*** 0.693*** 
 
1.771 1.745 1.630 
  (0.429) (0.439) (0.489) 
 
(0.213) (0.215) (0.205) 
 
(1.263) (1.259) (1.297) 
Fixed  




























N   3,317 3,317 2,437 
 
1,390 1,390 989 
 
3,317 3,317 2,437 
R-squared   0.217 0.225 0.239 
 
0.457 0.459 0.481 
 
0.296 0.297 0.277 
Panel A presents results for the regressions of Tobin’s q, Cost of Capital and Annual Stock Returns on communication for the sample of firms that cross-listed in 2006-2013. Robust 
standard errors clustered by firm are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. P-values are one-tailed when a directional 




Table 4 - Capital Market Benefits and Investor Communication Around Cross-Listing 
    
PANEL B: Decline in Valuation Post Cross-Listing and Investor Communication in the Home Country Prior to Cross-Listing 
    Tobin's q      Annual Stock Returns     
    
High Communication 




at Home Pre  
Cross-Listing 
  
    
High Communication 








  Pred. (1)   (2)   Diff.   (3)   (4)   Diff. 
Post - -0.356**  0.016  *  -0.322***  -0.086*  *** 




Post × High Comm. 
(in the U.S.) 
+ 0.373** 
 









(in the U.S.) 
  0.047  -0.060    -0.004  -0.190**     
  
(0.101) (0.133) (0.085) (0.083) 
    
             
Controls 





Year   
Country,  
Industry, 
Year       
Country,  
Industry, 
Year   
Country,  
Industry, 
Year     
N   617  2,700    617  2,700     
R-squared   0.377  0.253    0.243  0.331     
Panel B presents results for the regressions of Tobin’s q and Annual Stock Returns on communication for the sample of firms that cross-listed in 2006-2013. High 
Communication at Home Pre Cross-Listing is equal to one when the average number of corporate access events in the home country prior to cross-listing is greater than 
the sample median. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
P-values are one-tailed when a directional alternative hypothesis is provided and two-tailed otherwise. Variables are described in Appendix I. Continuous variables are 





Table 5 - Capital Market Benefits and Communication Choices of Cross-listed Firms in the Long Run 
PANEL A: Valuation, Liquidity and Communication Choices After Cross-Listing 
    Tobin's q Cost of Capital Turnover Bid-Ask Spread 
  Predictions (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Investor Communication Score +, - , +, - 0.116*** -0.011*** 0.269*** -0.003** 
    (0.037) (0.004) (0.080) (0.001) 
Equity Issuance 0.166*** -0.014* 0.250*** -0.007** 
    (0.046) (0.007) (0.091) (0.003) 
International Sales 0.191** 0.029** 0.217 0.001 
    (0.075) (0.013) (0.201) (0.003) 
IFRS   0.009 -0.011 -0.465*** -0.007** 
    (0.063) (0.014) (0.119) (0.003) 
Log of Assets -0.100*** -0.022*** 0.000 -0.006*** 
    (0.017) (0.004) (0.033) (0.001) 
Sales Growth 0.018 0.011* 0.151*** -0.001 
    (0.030) (0.006) (0.049) (0.002) 
ROA   -0.129 -0.204*** 0.280* -0.008 
    (0.141) (0.053) (0.149) (0.007) 
Leverage   0.527*** 0.057** 0.626*** 0.002 
    (0.110) (0.025) (0.209) (0.006) 
Constant   2.691*** 0.736*** 0.261 0.071*** 
    (0.317) (0.222) (0.600) (0.025) 














N   3,347 1,430 1,806 837 
R-squared   0.198 0.412 0.353 0.357 
Panel A presents results for Tobin’s q, Cost of Capital, Turnover in the U.S. and Bid-Ask Spread in the U.S. on investor communication after cross-
listing for all cross-listings. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. P-values are one-tailed when a directional alternative hypothesis is provided and two-tailed otherwise. Variables are described 




Table 5 - Capital Market Benefits and Communication Choices of Cross-listed Firms in the Long Run 
  
PANEL B: Path Analysis       
Path Regression Coefficients Total Path 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Indirect: Inv. Comm. → Log Number Analysts → Tobin's q 0.2580*** 0.0850** 0.0219*** 
Indirect: Inv. Comm. → Log Number Institutional Investors → Tobin's q 0.2071*** 0.0463** 0.0096** 
Indirect: Inv. Comm. → Log Number Media Articles → Tobin's q 0.3074*** 0.0222 0.0068* 
Direct: Inv. Comm. → Tobin's q   0.0776** 0.0776** 
Total     0.116*** 
        
Indirect: Inv. Comm. → Log Number Analysts → Cost of Capital 0.2580*** -0.0305*** -0.0079*** 
Indirect: Inv. Comm. → Log Number Institutional Investors → Cost of Capital 0.2071*** 0.0032 0.0007 
Indirect: Inv. Comm. → Log Number Media Articles → Cost of Capital 0.3074***  0.0006  0.0002 
Direct: Inv. Comm. → Cost of Capital   -0.0089** -0.0089** 
Total     -0.011*** 
        
Indirect: Inv. Comm. → Log Number Analysts →  Turnover 0.2580*** 0.2096*** 0.0541*** 
Indirect: Inv. Comm. → Log Number Institutional Investors → Turnover 0.2071*** 0.0837** 0.0173** 
Indirect: Inv. Comm. → Log Number Media Articles → Turnover 0.3074*** 0.0689* 0.0212** 
Direct: Inv. Comm. → Turnover   0.1802** 0.1802** 
Total     0.269*** 
        
Indirect: Inv. Comm. → Log Number Analysts → Bid-Ask Spread 0.2580*** -0.0048*** -0.0012*** 
Indirect: Inv. Comm. → Log Number Institutional Investors → Bid-Ask Spread 0.2071*** -0.0002 -0.0000 
Indirect: Inv. Comm. → Log Number Media Articles → Bid-Ask Spread 0.3074*** -0.0008* -0.0002 
Direct: Inv. Comm. → Bid-Ask Spread   -0.0012 -0.0012 
Total     -0.003** 
Panel B presents a path analysis to show the magnitude of the direct and indirect effects of Investor Communication on each outcome variable. Colum 1 presents the coefficients 
of multivariate regressions of investor communication on the following variables. Column 2 presents the coefficients of multivariate regressions of following and investor 
communication on the outcome variables. The indirect path between the Investor Communication and each outcome variable through the following variables is obtained by 
multiplying the coefficients on columns 1 and 2. I use the Preacher and Hayes (2008) method to compute bootstrap standard errors for the indirect paths. The direct path between 
IR and each outcome variable is the coefficient of Investor Communication Score on the outcome variables controlling for the following variables. The total effect is the sum 
of the indirect and direct paths. Variables are described in Appendix I.
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Table 5 - Capital Market Benefits and Communication Choices of Cross-listed Firms in 
the Long Run 
PANEL C: Communication Choices and Likelihood of Delisting 
    Delisting from the U.S. 
  Prediction (1) 
Investor Communication Score - -0.293** 
    
(0.144) 
Equity Issuance -0.638* 
    
(0.335) 
International Sales Ratio -0.335 
    
(0.337) 
IFRS   0.169 
    
(0.196) 
Log of Assets -0.129* 
    
(0.076) 
Sales Growth -0.175** 
    
(0.070) 
ROA   0.586* 
    
(0.301) 
Leverage   0.303 
    
(0.371) 
Constant   -11.451*** 
    
(1.943) 





N   3,347 
Pseudo R-squared 0.152 
Panel C presents results for a logit regression of delisting on investor communication for all cross-listings. Delisting from the 
U.S. is an indicator variable equal to one for firms that delist from the U.S. market during the sample period. Delisting dates 
are obtained from the depositary banks’ lists of ADRS and from CRSP. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are presented 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. P-values are one-tailed when a 
directional alternative hypothesis is provided and two-tailed otherwise. Variables are described in Appendix I. Continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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Table 6 - Cross-Sectional Tests 
PANEL A: Country Characteristics 
    Tobin's Q 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   
    Cultural Distance   Language   Corruption   Legal Tradition   
  Pred. Low High Diff. English Non-English Diff. Low High Diff. Common Law Code Law Diff. 
Inv. Comm. Score + 0.123*** 0.075* * 0.091** 0.129***  Not Sig. 0.122*** 0.079* * 0.096** 0.105** Not Sig.  






(0.045) (0.054)   


























Year   
N   1,510 1,837   1,222 2,125   1,685 1,662   1,508 1,562   
R-squared   0.232 0.177   0.209 0.210   0.253 0.178   0.205 0.207   
  
PANEL B: Firm Characteristics 
    Tobin's Q 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4)   
    Level of Listing   News Content   
  Pred. Exchange OTC Diff. Good News Bad News Diff. 
Inv. Comm. Score + 0.145*** 0.075* * 0.124*** 0.097** Not Sig.  
    (0.047) (0.052) 
 
(0.046) (0.045)   
 Controls   Included  Included    Included  Included    








Year   
N   910 2,437   742 1,037   
R-squared   0.366 0.206   0.296 0.229   
Table 6 presents results for Tobin’s q on investor communication after cross-listing for all cross-listings partitioned by high and low Cultural Distance, English and non-English 
countries, high and low Corruption, Common Law and Code Law countries, OTC and Exchange cross-listings, and Good and Bad News firm-years. High cultural distance equals one 
when the Cultural Distance score is greater than the median. High corruption equals one when the Control of Corruption score is lesser than the median. Level I listings and 144a 
private placements are classified as OTC, Levels II and III are classified as Exchange listings. News content is measured by the yearly average sentiment (CSS) of firm-initiated press 
releases according to RavenPack. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
P-values are one-tailed when a directional alternative hypothesis is provided and two-tailed otherwise. Variables are described in Appendix I. Continuous variables are winsorized at 




Table 7 - Instrumental Variables Regressions 
            
PANEL A: Two-Stage Least Squares Regressions             


















  Pred. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Inv. Comm. Score 
  
+,-,+,-   0.313** -0.025** 0.830*** -0.011**           
    (0.134) (0.014) (0.254) (0.007)           
Corporate Access U.S. 
  
+,-,+,-             0.430** -0.054* 1.149*** -0.011* 
              (0.203) (0.036) (0.453) (0.008) 
Direct Flight 
  
+ 0.325***         0.237***         
  (0.038)         (0.057)         
Imports and Exports   -0.064 -0.063 -0.003 0.078 0.026* -0.326 0.057 -0.011 0.270 0.018 
FDI   0.009 -0.028 -0.003 0.056 0.002 -0.052 -0.003 -0.005 0.113 0.001 
Corporate Access Home   0.239*** 0.004 0.004 -0.170** 0.003* 0.641*** -0.197 0.034 -0.692** 0.008 
Equity Issuance   0.226*** 0.240* 0.026 0.317* -0.011*** 0.486*** 0.101 0.022 0.101 -0.003 
Exchange Cross-Listing   0.528*** -0.028 0.022 -0.466*** 0.004* 0.487*** -0.072 0.037 -0.657*** 0.005 
IFRS   0.081 -0.010 -0.011 -0.069 -0.006 0.266*** -0.099 0.004 -0.245 0.001 
International Sales   0.230*** 0.142** 0.025** -0.054 0.005 0.389*** 0.047 0.031** -0.260 0.010 
Log of Assets   0.129*** -0.126*** -0.022*** -0.045 -0.006*** 0.055*** -0.109*** -0.023*** 0.002 -0.007*** 
Sales Growth   0.003 0.019 0.009 0.039 -0.000 0.057* -0.004 0.010 -0.020 0.002 
ROA   -0.068 -0.087 -0.208*** -0.014 -0.007 -0.036 -0.093 -0.202*** -0.059 -0.006 
Leverage   -0.223*** 0.567*** 0.065*** 0.195* 0.001 -0.553*** 0.735*** 0.040 0.711** -0.004 
Constant   -1.135 4.998 0.880 -1.372 -0.580* 8.269 1.293 1.108 -8.056 -0.364 































Adj. R-squared 0.533         0.333         
Robust F 73.768         17.188         
Minimum eigenvalue  
statistic 
68.990         10.561         
2SLS Size of nominal 5%  
Wald test 
5.530         5.530         
Panel A presents coefficients from the two-stage least squares regressions. Column 1 and 6 present first-stage regression results for the investor communication score and corporate access 
events in the U.S. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. P-values are one-




Table 7 - Instrumental Variables Regressions 
PANEL B: Average Change in Communication for Direct Flight Initiations and Terminations 
  Firms Pre Post Diff. 
Direct Flight Initiation: 
    
Mean Investor Communication Score 53 0.504 0.822 0.318*** 
Mean Corporate Access U.S. 53 0.136 0.333 0.197** 
     
Direct Flight Termination: 
    
Mean Investor Communication Score 29 0.862 0.599 -0.263** 
Mean Corporate Access U.S. 29 0.450 0.167 -0.283** 
Panel B presents the mean investor communication scores and number of corporate access events held in the U.S. before and after 





Table 8 - Communication with Local versus U.S. investors 
PANEL A: Corporate Access Events Held in the U.S. and in the Home Country 
    Tobin's q Cost of Capital Turnover U.S. Bid-Ask Spread U.S. 
  Predictions (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Proportion Corp. Access  
Home vs U.S. 
- , + , - , + -0.205** 0.025** -0.084 0.001 
  
(0.101) (0.013) (0.151) (0.003) 















N   1,004 465 641 349 
R-squared   0.226 0.429 0.401 0.490 
 
 
PANEL B: Falsification Tests 
  Turnover Bid-Ask Spread 
  U.S. Home U.S. Home 


















Inv. Comm. Score 
(U.S.) 
  
    -0.007     -0.001 




Controls Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  


















N 1,806 1,295 1,295 837 2,766 2,766 
R-squared 0.338 0.308 0.307 0.350 0.321 0.321 
Panel A presents the results for regressions of the proportion of corporate access events held in the firm’s home country versus in 
the U.S. during the year on valuation and liquidity in the U.S. variables. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are presented in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. P-values are one-tailed when a 
directional alternative hypothesis is provided and two-tailed otherwise. Variables are described in Appendix I. Continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Panel B presents regressions of corporate access events held in the firms’ 
home country on liquidity variables in the U.S. and corporate access and investor communication scores in the U.S. on liquidity 
variables in the home country’s exchange. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. P-values are one-tailed when a directional alternative hypothesis 




Table 9 - Initiation and Termination of Investor Communication Activities and Capital Market Benefits 
    Mean Tobin's q   Mean Cost of Capital   Mean Turnover   Mean Bid-Ask Spread 
  Firms Pre Post Diff.   Pre Post Diff.   Pre Post Diff.   Pre Post Diff. 
Initiation of:                                 
Corporate Access US 258 1.702 1.857 0.155**   0.197 0.168 -0.029**   0.761 0.655 -0.106   0.017 0.013 -0.004* 
Conference Calls 296 1.630 1.547 -0.083   0.213 0.180 -0.033***   0.211 0.880 0.669***   0.010 0.013 0.003 
Press Releases 187 1.579 1.699 0.119*   0.226 0.182 -0.045***   0.088 0.309 0.220***   0.027 0.013 -0.013** 
Management Forecasts 229 1.698 1.588 -0.110** 0.160 0.165 0.005   0.364 1.310 0.946***   0.013 0.012 -0.001 
                                  
Termination of:                                 
Corporate Access US 225 1.702 1.559 -0.143** 0.188 0.193 0.005   0.889 0.744 -0.145   0.013 0.019 0.006* 
Conference Calls 146 1.591 1.662 0.071   0.167 0.219 0.051***   0.345 0.130 
-
0.214*** 
  0.013 0.024 0.011* 
Press Releases 312 1.638 1.501 -0.137** 0.177 0.218 0.040***   0.393 0.354 -0.039   0.012 0.020 0.008** 
Management Forecasts 149 1.468 1.671 0.202*** 0.156 0.175 0.019*   0.917 0.249 
-
0.688*** 
  0.013 0.013 0.000 
Table 9 presents the mean Tobin’s q, Cost of Capital, Turnover in the U.S. and Bid-Ask Spread in the U.S. of cross-listed firms before and after the initiation or termination of each 




Table 10 - Valuation Premium of Cross-Listed Firms Relative to Non-Cross-Listed Firms and Communication Choices 
PANEL A: Valuation Premium of Cross-listed versus Matched Non-Cross-Listed Firms and Communication Choices After Cross-
listing  
    Tobin’s q 
  Prediction (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Xlisted + 0.121** 0.059 0.075* 0.059 0.097** 0.020 0.023 
    (0.052) (0.052) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) 
DCorporate Access US +  0.330***    0.275***  
     (0.064)    (0.068)  
DConference Call +   0.158***   0.031  
      (0.049)   (0.048)  
DPress Release +    0.204***  0.147***  
       (0.045)  (0.043)  
DManagement Forecast +     0.117** -0.021  
        (0.058) (0.063)  
Inv. Comm. Score +       0.137*** 
        (0.030) 
Controls    Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N   5,648 5,648 5,648 5,648 5,648 5,648 5,648 
R-squared   0.060 0.072 0.064 0.068 0.062 0.076 0.072 
  
PANEL B: Valuation Premium of Cross-Listed Firms Relative to Non-Cross-Listed Firms by Indicator Communication Variable 
    Tobin’s q 











Xlisted + 0.183*** 0.135** 0.001 -0.066 
    (0.062) (0.071) (0.075) (0.086) 
Controls    Included  Included  Included  Included  
N   4,039 3,080 2,568 1,609 
R-squared   0.047 0.050 0.085 0.126 
Panel A presents results for the regressions of Tobin’s q on communication after cross-listing for all cross-listings and a matched sample of non-cross-listed firm-years. Robust 
standard errors clustered by firm are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. P-values are one-tailed when a 
directional alternative hypothesis is provided and two-tailed otherwise. Variables are described in Appendix I. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Panel B presents results for the regressions of Tobin’s q on Xlisted for all cross-listed and non-cross-listed firm-years partitioning firms based on their communication choices. 
A firm is considered a communicating firm in a given year when at least one of the communication indicator variables is equal to one. Robust standard errors clustered by firm 
are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. P-values are one-tailed when a directional alternative hypothesis is 



















Annual Stock Returns Cumulative monthly stock returns during the year. 
  
Bid-Ask Spread 
Annual average of the daily bid-ask spreads in the U.S. Daily bid-ask spreads are computed as the 
daily ask quote minus the daily bid quote divided by the midpoint between the bid and the ask quotes. 
  
Common Law 
Indicator variable equal to one for countries with an English Common Law legal system according to 
the CIA Factbook. Countries with mixed Code and Common Law systems are considered Code Law 
countries. 
   
Conference Calls Number of conference calls in English held by the firm during the year according to Bloomberg. 
  
Corporate Access US 
Number of capital market conferences, investor days and non-deal roadshows in the U.S. that the firm 
participated in during the year according to Bloomberg. 
    
Corporate Access Home 
Number of capital market conferences, investor days and non-deal roadshows in the home country 
that the firm participated in during the year according to Bloomberg. 
  
Corruption 
An aggregated score that ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 and captures perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well 
as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. This data comes from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI). 
  
Cost of Capital 
Implied cost of capital using the residual income valuation model of Claus and Thomas (2001) and 
analyst earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S. General assumptions and data requirements follow those in 
the appendix of Hail and Leuz (2009). 
    
Country-Industry Peers 
Average number of corporate access events or conference calls held by firms in the same country and 
Fama-French 12 industry, excluding the firm itself. 
  
Cultural Distance 
Average of the differences in the scores for Hofstede’s six cultural dimensions between the U.S. and 
the firm’s country. The six dimensions include the Power Distance Index, Individualism versus 
Collectivism, the Uncertainty Avoidance Index, Masculinity versus Femininity, Long-Term 
Orientation versus Short-Term Orientation, and Indulgence versus Restraint. This data is from The 
Hofstede Centre’s website. 
  
DCommunication 
An indicator variable equal to one if at least one of the communication indicator variables 
(DCorporate Access US, DConference Call, DPress Release or DManagement Forecast) is equal to 
one. 
DConference Call 
An indicator variable equal to one if the firm held at least one conference call in English during the 
year. 
  
DCorporate Access US 
An indicator variable equal to one if the firm participated in at least one corporate access event in the 





Variable Definitions (Continued) 
Variable Definition 
Direct Flight 
An indicator variable equal to one if an airport less than 50 miles away from the city of a firm’s 
headquarters has a direct flight to JFK, LGA or EWR according to the T-100 segment database from 
the U.S. Department of Transportation. 
    
DManagement Forecast An indicator variable equal to one if the firm disclosed at least one forecast during the year. 
    
DPress Release 
An indicator variable equal to one if the firm disseminated at least one press release during the year 
using PR Newswire or Business Wire. 
    
English 
Indicator variable equal to one for countries where English is an official language (de jure or de facto) 
according to the CIA Factbook. 
    
Equity Issuance Indicator variable equal to one if the firm issued shares during the year according to Datastream. 
  
Exchange Cross-listing An indicator variable equal to one if the firm is listed on NYSE or NASDAQ. 
    
FDI 




Indicator variable equal to one for cross-listed firms with investor communication scores in the upper 
quartile. 
    
IFRS 
Indicator variable equal to one for observations from the IFRS countries, with fiscal year ends after 
the mandatory adoption date. I follow Christensen, Hail, and Leuz (2013) and Naranjo, Saavedra, and 
Verdi (2016) and include European countries’ IFRS mandates, in 2005, as well as mandates in other 
countries at different dates.  
  
Imports and Exports 
Log of the sum of imports and exports between the U.S. and the firm home country during the year 
according to the ComTrade, UN. 
 
Index Participant 
An indicator variable equal to one if the firm participates in a local market index according to 
Datastream. 
    
International Sales Ratio of international sales to total sales according to Datastream. 
  
Inv. Comm. Score 
Regression-based factor scores for the principal component factor analysis of the four investor 
communication variables (Corporate Access US, Conference Calls, Management Forecasts and Log 
of Press Releases). 
  
Lead Asset Growth Percentage change in total assets from year t to year t+1. 
    
Lead Earnings Growth Percentage change in earnings from year t to year t+1. 
    
Leverage Ratio of total liabilities over total assets. 
  
Log Assets 





Variable Definitions (Continued) 
Variable Definition 
Log Press Releases 
Log of 1 plus the number of firm-initiated press releases disseminated by PR Newswire and Business 
Wire according to Factiva.  
  
Management Forecasts 
Number of initial forecasts disclosed by the firm during the year according to I/B/E/S Guidance. 
Includes forecasts of earnings, EBITDA, sales, dividends, CAPEX and margins for all horizons. 
    
News Content 
Average composite sentiment (CSS) of the firm-initiated press releases disclosed during the year 
according to RavenPack. Good news years are defined as firm-years with average CSS greater than 
50. Bad news years are defined as firm-years with average CSS lesser or equal to 50. I define firm-
initiated press releases as the articles in RavenPack with a relevance score>90 and News Type equal 
to Press-Release. I order to avoid duplicates, I delete press releases disclosed less than 15 minutes 
apart. 
    
Number of Analysts Number of distinct analysts issuing a forecast for the firm during the year according to I/B/E/S. 
  
Number of Institutions 
Number of U.S. institutional investors according to Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings and 
Mutual Funds Databases using the last report of the year. 
    
Number of Media Articles 
Number of media articles disclosed during the year according to RavenPack. I keep only articles with 
a relevance score>90 and news type equal to Full Article. 
  
Proportion Corp.  
Access Home vs U.S. 
Corporate Access Home/(Corporate Access US + Corporate Access Home) 
    
ROA Ratio of net income before extraordinary items over total assets.  
  
Sales Growth 
Growth rate in sales measured as sales in the current year minus sales in the prior year divided by 
sales in the prior year. 
  
Tobin’s q Market value of equity plus book value of liabilities divided by book value of assets. 
  
Turnover 
Annual share turnover in the U.S. measured as the sum of the daily number of shares traded in the 
U.S. divided by the total shares outstanding. 
    
Xlisted 
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